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THE POWER CANONS
LISA HEINZERLING*
ABSTRACT
With three recent decisions—Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
King v. Burwell, and Michigan v. EPA—the Supreme Court has em-
braced a new trio of canons of statutory interpretation. When an
agency charged with administering a long-existing statute asserts
regulatory authority it has not previously used, in a matter having
large economic and political significance, its interpretation will be
met with skepticism. When an agency charged with administering an
ambiguous statutory provision answers a question of large economic
and political significance, one central to the statutory regime, and the
Court believes the agency is not an expert in the matter, the Court
may ignore the agency’s interpretation altogether. And when an agen-
cy charged with administering a statute interprets an ambiguous
provision to permit the agency not to consider costs before deciding
to regulate, the Court will likely find that the agency acted unreason-
ably. In each case, the Court took interpretive power from an admin-
istrative agency, power that would normally have been the agency’s
due under the Chevron framework, and kept it for itself. And in each
case, the Court’s seizure of power aligned with its basic distrust of an
active administrative state. I call the new canons the “power canons.”
The power canons not only rearrange the Chevron-dominated
relationship between the courts and administrative agencies; they
also realign the relationship between the courts and Congress. The
* Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
I am grateful to Dan Farber, Greg Keating, Marty Lederman, John Nagle, Victoria Nourse,
Catherine Sharkey, Gerry Spann, Rena Steinzor, and participants in law school faculty
workshops at the University of Maryland, the University of Minnesota, and the University
of Southern California for insightful comments and discussion, and to Jake Friedman for
excellent research assistance.
1933
1934 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1933
power canons are clear-statement principles, directed as much to
Congress as to the agencies; they instruct Congress to speak clearly
if it wants to make certain substantive results available under a
statutory regime. And they require clear congressional language only
to enable an ambitious regulatory agenda, not to disable one. This
asymmetry is the sign that the power canons mask a judicial agenda
hostile to a robust regulatory state.
This judicial agenda has no basis in law. The power canons are
not based on a careful analysis of what Congress likely meant in
employing broad or ambiguous language in the relevant statutes.
Nor do they come from judicial precedent. Although two of the can-
ons draw upon previous decisions alluding to the significance (in two
different senses) of an interpretive question as a factor in statutory
interpretation, the recent cases both resuscitate that factor after in-
tervening cases had signaled its demise and add new, distinctive
parameters. The last canon, on regulatory costs, is utterly new. 
Although the power canons do not align with the relevant statutes
or prior judicial precedents, they are consistent with the dissatisfac-
tion some Justices have expressed with the scope and power of the
modern administrative state. In recent years, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have all written or
joined opinions decrying the growth of the administrative state and
its tension with constitutional provisions on the separation of powers.
No Court majority, however, has been assembled actually to strike
down any law based on the broadest constitutional theories that
these Justices have espoused. However, by trimming Congress’s pow-
er to enable robust regulation through broad or ambiguous language,
the power canons may achieve much of what the Justices have been
unable to achieve directly through their constitutional views. Thus,
one way to understand the power canons is as applications of an
exceedingly strong version of the constitutional avoidance doctrine,
one that would permit judicial amendment of statutes even in the
absence of an articulation of the constitutional problem the statutory
adjustments are designed to avoid. Viewing the power canons in this
way does not redeem them.
Some scholars have suggested that interpretive canons may be
justified by appealing to broader norms. Borrowing from Professor
William Eskridge’s normative framework for evaluating interpretive
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canons, I assess the power canons according to whether they promote
the rule-of-law values of predictability and objectivity, democratic
values, and widely shared public values. I conclude that the power
canons undermine rather than promote these values. The power can-
ons’ unpredictability and subjectivity upset rule-of-law values. Their
blunt approach ignores details of statutory history and design, and
thus their application drives a wedge between legislative objectives
and judicial outcomes. They undermine the public values of separa-
tion of powers and deliberation by enlarging the judicial power at the
expense of the legislative and executive branches and by pushing
back against only one side of the debate over the scope of regulatory
power.
The Supreme Court should renounce the power canons.
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INTRODUCTION
With three recent decisions, the Supreme Court has embraced a
new trio of canons of statutory interpretation. When an agency
charged with administering a long-existing statute asserts regula-
tory authority it has not previously used in a matter having large
economic and political significance, its interpretation will be met
with skepticism.1 When an agency charged with administering an
ambiguous statutory provision answers a question of large economic
and political significance central to the statutory regime, and the
Court believes the agency is not an expert in the matter, the Court
may ignore the agency’s interpretation altogether.2 And when an
agency charged with administering a statute interprets an ambigu-
ous provision to permit that agency not to consider costs before
deciding to regulate, the Court will likely find that the agency acted
unreasonably.3
In each of these cases, the Court put Congress on notice that it
would need to speak clearly if it wanted to give administrative
agencies interpretive authority over certain kinds of decisions.4 In
each case, the Court took interpretive power from an administrative
agency, power that would normally have been the agency’s due
under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,5 and kept it
for itself. And in each case, the Court’s seizure of power aligned with
its basic distrust of an active administrative state.6 Consistent with
this politically inspired shift in power from the executive branch to
the courts, I call the new canons the “power canons.”
The power canons are striking enough for their rearrangement
of the Chevron-dominated relationship between the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies; however, they are even more noteworthy,
and troubling, for their rearrangement of the relationship be-
tween the courts and Congress. The power canons do not just oust
Chevron deference, which, of course, is itself a principle of statutory
1. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
2. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
3. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015).
4. See id. at 2710; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489; Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
5. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
6. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s distrust).
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interpretation created by the courts.7 The power canons also in-
struct Congress that it must speak clearly if it wants to make
certain substantive results available under a statutory regime.8 The
power canons are, in other words, clear-statement principles, direc-
ted as much to Congress as to the agencies. And they require clear
congressional language to enable an ambitious regulatory agenda
but not to disable one.9 This asymmetry is the power canons’ tell; it
is a sign that they mask a judicial agenda hostile to a robust
regulatory state.
This judicial agenda has no basis in law. First, it has no basis in
the statutes underlying the cases in which the power canons arose.
The power canons were not based on a careful analysis of what
Congress likely meant in employing broad or ambiguous language
in the relevant statutes. Instead, the power canons came from
somewhere outside of the statutes and put a big, grumpy thumb on
the scales in interpreting them. Furthermore, the judicial agenda
reflected in the power canons has no basis in prior judicial opinions.
The power canons either depart from or ignore prior judicial opin-
ions on statutory interpretation.10 Although two of the canons draw
upon previous decisions alluding to the significance (in two different
senses) of an interpretive question as a factor in statutory interpre-
tation, the recent cases both resuscitate that factor after intervening
cases had signaled its demise and add new, distinctive parameters.11
The last canon, on regulatory costs, is utterly new, and it sits un-
comfortably beside prior decisions on the relevance of such costs to
regulatory decisions.12
Although the power canons do not align with the relevant
statutes or prior judicial precedents, they are consistent with the
dissatisfaction some Justices have expressed with the scope and
7. See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (declining to apply Chevron at all).
8. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2710; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489; Util. Air Regulatory Grp.,
134 S. Ct. at 2444.
9. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (indicating that Congress should
speak clearly if it wants agencies to have control over decisions of vast economic and political
significance without addressing Congress’s intent regarding disabling the statutory scheme).
10. Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (establishing two-step framework to review an
agency’s interpretations of the statute it administers), with King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89
(declining to apply the Chevron framework).
11. See infra Parts I.A-B.
12. See infra Part I.C.3.
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power of the modern administrative state. In recent years, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
have all written or joined opinions decrying the growth of the
administrative state and its tension with constitutional provisions
on the separation of powers;13 but no Court majority has been
actually assembled to strike down any law based on the broadest
constitutional theories that these Justices have espoused. However,
by trimming Congress’s power to enable robust regulation through
broad or ambiguous language, the power canons may achieve
indirectly much of what the Justices have been unable to achieve
directly through their constitutional views. In fact, one way to in-
terpret the power canons is as applications of an exceedingly strong
version of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, one that would
permit judicial amendment of statutes even in the absence of an
articulation of the constitutional problem the judicial adjustments
are designed to avoid. Viewing the power canons as applications of
a problematic variant of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance—
itself a problematic interpretive canon—does not redeem them.14
The lack of a legal basis for the power canons—in statutes, ju-
dicial precedent, or constitutional doctrine—should be enough to
doom them. Some scholars, however, have suggested that inter-
pretive canons may perhaps be justified by appealing to broader
norms. Such norms must, as Professor William Eskridge has ar-
gued, spring from something other than, and more than, judges’ own
political preferences.15 Borrowing from Professor Eskridge’s nor-
mative framework for evaluating interpretive canons, I assess the
power canons according to whether they promote the rule-of-law
values of predictability and objectivity, democratic values, or widely
shared public values.16
I conclude that the power canons undermine rather than promote
these normative values. The power canons’ unpredictability and
subjectivity upset rule-of-law values.17 Their blunt approach ignores
details of statutory history and design, and thus their application
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 576 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, infra note 27).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Parts III.A-B.
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drives a wedge between legislative objectives and judicial out-
comes.18 The power canons also undermine the public values of
separation of powers and deliberation by enlarging the judicial
power at the expense of the legislative and executive branches and
by leaning hard against one side of the debate over the scope of
regulatory power.19
Despite their legal frailty and normative weaknesses, the power
canons have already played a highly salient role in litigation over
some of the Obama Administration’s most ambitious executive
actions. In applications to the Supreme Court for a stay of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) “Clean Power Plan,” setting
guidelines for state regulation of greenhouse gases from power
plants, the five sets of applicants leaned heavily on one of the power
canons, embraced in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. EPA,
in arguing that the rule violated the Clean Air Act.20 There is reason
to believe that the five Justices who voted to grant the stay relied on
this interpretive principle.21 Likewise, in their challenge to the
Obama Administration’s largest deferred-action policy on immigra-
tion, Texas and several other states relied on UARG and King v.
Burwell to argue that Congress did not give the executive branch
the authority it claimed.22
The interpretive principle embraced in Michigan v. EPA has also
been playing a large role in lower court decisions. In rejecting the
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s designation of insurance
giant MetLife as a systemically important financial institution—or
“too big to fail”—a federal district court relied on Michigan in
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. See, e.g., Application by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final
Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for Review at iii-iv, West Virginia v. EPA, 136
S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (No. 15A773), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
01/15A773-application.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ6Y-AC2P] (indicating that UARG v. EPA and
Michigan v. EPA can be found “passim” in the document). The petitioners challenging the
Clean Power Plan in the D.C. Circuit have also relied heavily on UARG. See Opening Brief
of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 3-4, 23-34, 66, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2016.02.19_petrs_opening_
brief_pt._1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V46-A89E].
21. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL.
L. REV. 425, 426-29 (2016).
22. See Brief for the State Respondents at 16, 44, 52, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).
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faulting the agency for not considering the costs to MetLife of
subjecting the company to more intense regulation.23 In addition,
the D.C. Circuit, citing Michigan for the reasonableness of cost-
benefit analysis, made quick work of an argument that the Federal
Aviation Administration should have regulated the hours of cargo
pilots when it restricted hours for passenger flight crews.24 Given
that the key statutory term at issue in Michigan—“appropriate”—
appears more than 10,000 times in the United States Code, Michi-
gan may well turn out to be the most consequential of the three
cases discussed in this Article.25
Of course, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed
since these three cases were decided. Justice Scalia’s death may
affect the future course of the power canons. He was not only the
leading developer of these canons—he wrote the majority opinion
for the Court in two of the three cases featured here26—but he was
also the Court’s most ardent promoter of interpretive canons in
general.27 In addition, he authored the majority opinions in several
of the other, most central cases in the discussion that follows.28 Even
so, the three decisions featured here were each joined by at least
four Justices who remain on the Court.29 More dramatically, two
elements of the power canons have been embraced by all eight
current Justices: the idea that the ordinary Chevron calculus might
be altered for questions of great “economic and political signifi-
cance,” either by denying deference to an agency30 or by ditching the
23. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 239-42
(D.D.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-5086 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2016).
24. See Indep. Pilots Ass’n v. FAA, 638 F. App’x 6, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curium).
25. As of March 14, 2017, a Westlaw search for TE(appropriate) in the U.S. Code An-
notated returns 10,000 results, the maximum amount that Westlaw allows.
26. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (2014).
27. See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
28. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013); Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 212 (2009); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
462 (2001); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737 (1996); MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).
29. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2702 (syllabus); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2484
(2015) (syllabus); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2432 (syllabus).
30. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442-44 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
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Chevron framework altogether,31 and the presumption that an agen-
cy must, unless Congress provides otherwise, consider costs before
regulating.32 Thus, although it would be foolish to predict that
Justice Scalia’s absence will have no effect on the Court’s interpre-
tive practices going forward, it would be equally foolish to ignore the
substantial support on the current Court for the interpretive
principles criticized here.
In Part I, I begin by analyzing the Court’s decisions embracing
the power canons. I describe the content of the canons and argue
that these interpretive principles were not drawn from Congress’s
likely intended meaning in the underlying statutes or from prior
judicial precedent. The power canons are, in other words, normative,
insofar as they are not based on a meaningful assessment of what
Congress likely “meant ... by employing particular statutory lan-
guage,”33 and they are new. In Part II, I discuss the possibility that
the power canons adjust the permissible reach of regulatory regimes
in order to avoid constitutional anxieties about the modern adminis-
trative state. I argue that the legal weakness of the potentially
applicable constitutional doctrines and the problems of the avoid-
ance doctrine itself, and of the warped variant that would be at
work here, fatally undermine use of these doctrines to justify the
power canons. In Part III, I argue that the broad normative grounds
that Professor Eskridge has identified for evaluating the legitimacy
of interpretive canons34 do not justify the power canons.
I conclude that the Supreme Court should renounce the power
canons.
31. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
32. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708; id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
33. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (distinguishing normative canons from
descriptive canons). I use the terminology “normative” canons, but others use the label
“substantive” to refer to canons that are not based on linguistic presumptions or grammatical
conventions. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTER-
PRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 447-48 (2014).
I do not mean to imply a substantive message by choosing one set of the standard terms over
the other.
34. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 576-82. 
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I. CANONIZING POWER
In UARG, King, and Michigan, the Court declined to defer to
agency interpretations of statutes that the agencies were charged
with administering.35 In UARG and Michigan, the Court found that
the agencies’ interpretations were unreasonable and declined to
defer to either of the agencies’ interpretations.36 In King, the Court
declined to apply the Chevron framework at all.37 Combining the
Justices’ votes in UARG and King, all of the current Justices have
now signed onto the principle that the deferential Chevron frame-
work might be altered for questions of great “economic and political
significance,” either by denying deference to an agency (UARG) or
by deserting the framework altogether (King).38 Collectively, these
cases suggest that at least several Justices are in a bad mood about
Chevron, and, for that reason alone, these cases may portend more
trouble ahead for administrative interpretations.
More fundamentally, these cases create a new trio of clear-state-
ment principles, the result of which is to lodge interpretive power
with the courts when the underlying statutory framework is too
ambitious for the Court’s comfort. I believe that the asymmetric
thrust of the power canons—pushing statutory regimes away from
responsiveness and dynamism and toward regulatory passivity—is,
more than their dilution of Chevron deference, their core problem.39
In this Part, however, my main burden is to describe the power
canons and to explain why I believe they are both normative and
new. The canons’ normativity supports my later insistence that the
35. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89; Util. Air Regulatory
Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
36. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708; Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442-44.
37. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
38. In UARG, Justice Scalia was joined in Part II-A of his opinion by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. 134 S. Ct. at 2432 (syllabus). In King, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
135 S. Ct. at 2484 (syllabus). For a thoughtful discussion of the Justices’ potentially differing
motivations for joining this part of the opinion in King, see Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps)
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 62-66.
39. But see Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 359-60 (2016) (arguing that the three cases
discussed here are normatively justified precisely because they reflect selective carve-outs
from Chevron).
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canons at least be normatively justified.40 Their novelty simulta-
neously begs for a normative justification,41 and helps to defeat nor-
mative claims that might be made on their behalf.42
The power canons’ novelty might also make one hesitant to call
them “canons”; this category, one might insist, includes only very
old rules—rules so old, indeed, they have Latin names.43 By using
the term “canon,” I mean simply to refer to the way I believe the
Supreme Court has treated the power canons—as rules or principles
of interpretation. Litigants and lower courts have also been treating
the power canons this way.44 It may well be that valid or at least
normatively unproblematic interpretive canons are usually distin-
guished by their antiquity. But it would be reckless to ignore the
rule-like character with which the Supreme Court has imbued the
power canons just because one thinks “canons” cannot be brand
new. Apparently, for now, they can.
A. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA
1. The Canon
In UARG, the Court considered whether the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) had reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act
to require permits for stationary sources of greenhouse gases once
those air pollutants were regulated under a separate provision of
the Act addressing mobile sources.45 The Court concluded that this
interpretation was unreasonable because it would have, for the first
time, ushered in a permitting requirement for potentially millions
of relatively small sources, straining government resources past the
breaking point.46 To forestall this result, EPA had issued a rule
40. See infra Part III.
41. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 125-26 (2001).
42. See infra Part III.A (discussing power canons’ failure of predictability, partly on
grounds of novelty).
43. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 344-45, 352 (2010) (discussing how canons of legal interpretation have been “used
since antiquity,” noting examples such as expressio unius and ejusdem generis).
44. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
45. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (2014).
46. See id. at 2442-44.
2017] THE POWER CANONS 1945
phasing in the permitting requirement over time.47 The Court,
however, also rejected this attempt to soften the blow of the new
permitting requirement by phasing it in over a period of years.48
The Court chastised EPA for finding in its longstanding Clean Air
Act authority the power to regulate a large group of relatively small
stationary sources.49 The Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the
majority, reviewed EPA’s interpretation under the Chevron frame-
work and concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the triggering
event for the Clean Air Act’s permitting requirement was unreason-
able, because it greatly expanded EPA’s regulatory authority:
EPA’s interpretation is ... unreasonable because it would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s
regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the
American economy,” we typically greet its announcement with
a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if
it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast “economic and
political significance.” ... Moreover, in EPA’s assertion of that
authority, we confront a singular situation: an agency laying
claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy
while at the same time strenuously asserting that the authority
claimed would render the statute “unrecognizable to the
Congress that designed” it. Since ... the statute does not compel
EPA’s interpretation, it would be patently unreasonable—not to
say outrageous—for EPA to insist on seizing expansive power
that it admits the statute is not designed to grant.50
Part of the problem for EPA, then, was that it was at once claiming
an obligation to regulate relatively small sources and disclaiming
47. See id. at 2444-46.
48. See id. at 2446.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 2444 (citations omitted) (first quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129 (2000); then quoting id. at 160; and then quoting Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514,
31,555 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.70)). Here, Justice Scalia is speaking for
five Justices. Two Justices joined Scalia for the entire opinion, and two other Justices joined
those three in the second-to-last part of his opinion, discussing specific requirements for
permitted sources. See id. at 2432 (syllabus).
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the capacity to do so.51 To the extent that EPA got into trouble
because it had declined to exercise the full force of the regulatory
authority it had just asserted, it might be fair to describe the inter-
pretive principle of the above paragraph as applying only when an
agency goes less than full bore in using its regulatory authority. In
this rendering, the Court’s decision in UARG could be understood
as faulting EPA not for delivering a regulatory punch, but for pul-
ling one.
It is hard, however, to ignore the antiregulatory tone of the
quoted passage. The Court had, after all, declined to review the
question involving a direct challenge to EPA’s rule phasing in, over
time, the permitting requirements for stationary sources emitting
greenhouse gases.52 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit had found that parties
challenging this separate rule had no standing to do so because the
rule relieved their regulatory burden rather than adding to it.53 The
direct target of the Court’s review in UARG was not the relaxation
of regulatory requirements under the Clean Air Act, but the ac-
tivation of them.54
Given this context, it seems fairest to infer from the quoted pas-
sage a canon of interpretation along the following lines: when an
agency interprets a “long-extant statute” to permit it to regulate in
an area of “vast ‘economic and political significance,’” the Court will,
in the absence of clear congressional authorization, “greet its an-
nouncement with a measure of skepticism.”55
This canon is normative, and it is new. 
51. See id. at 2444 (majority opinion).
52. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. 418 (2013) (mem.) (granting review limited
to question of “[w]hether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air
Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
1, Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (No. 12-1146) (asking for review on both the
timing and substance of the proposed EPA regulation).
53. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 147-48 (D.C. Cir.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2427.
54. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2438-39.
55. Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160).
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2. Normativity
The UARG canon does not rest on, or even purport to rest on,
Congress’s likely meaning in using the relevant language of the
Clean Air Act. Instead, as the Court describes it, this interpretive
principle rests on an expectation of clarity created by the Court
itself: “We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”56 This
canon is both a presumption against certain kinds of agency inter-
pretations and an instruction to Congress: if Congress wants to as-
sign economically and politically important regulatory questions to
an agency, it must speak clearly. And it must have done so under
“long-extant” statutes that (long) predated the Court’s embrace of
this canon.57
Even if the Court had purported to rest the new canon on the
kind of language Congress would likely have used if it had intended
to grant the asserted power to EPA, it would be hard to credit such
a claim. The Court held that the Clean Air Act was ambiguous as
to the inclusion of sources, based solely on account of their emission
of greenhouse gases, within the stationary-source permitting pro-
gram.58 An assertion that Congress would have spoken more clearly
if it had meant to give EPA the power to include these sources in the
program59 ignores the puzzle introduced by ambiguity: how is the
legislature supposed to “speak clearly” in assigning interpretive
authority to an agency, when the legislature is enacting a statutory
provision that is, according to the Court, ambiguous?60 The inter-
pretive principle in UARG is an instruction to Congress to avoid
ambiguity altogether in some cases.61
Moreover, the notion that Congress can be expected to explicitly
delegate certain matters to administrative agencies if it wishes the
agencies to resolve ambiguities related to them is belied by Con-
gress’s general reticence about such delegations. As then-Professors
David Barron and Elena Kagan observed in an article on Chevron’s
56. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 2442-44.
59. See id. at 2444.
60. See id. at 2442-44.
61. See id. at 2444.
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reach, Congress has almost never expressly stipulated the level
of, or fact of, deference to be given to implementing agencies.62
Congress has remained silent on interpretive delegations despite
the fact that, among congressional aides, Chevron itself is the best
known of all of the judge-made rules of statutory interpretation.63 It
thus would be hard to credit an implication that the UARG canon
reflects the clarity with which Congress can be expected to delegate
interpretive authority over certain matters. It is not only that Con-
gress does not speak clearly about interpretive delegations; most
often, it does not speak at all.64 The UARG canon is therefore best
understood as the Court in fact describes it: as an instruction to
Congress about the degree of clarity it must use in delegating
certain kinds of questions to agencies, not as an observation about
the degree of clarity Congress does use.65
In fact, Congress must not only be clear, but also clairvoyant.
Congress must anticipate that it will not have foreseen all problems
that will arise and that will come within a statute’s regulatory
range. Congress must then foresee that the agency to which it has
given regulatory authority will, when new problems arise, try to
address those problems with its existing authority even though—be-
cause the problems are new—the agency has not addressed them
before. Having foreseen all of these events, Congress then must use
statutory language that pellucidly covers the future problems and
gives the agency the power to address them. The Court might as
well have instructed Congress to fabricate a crystal ball.
3. Novelty
The UARG canon is also novel, departing from judicial precedent
in several respects.
First, in requiring a clear statement from Congress in order to del-
egate to an agency interpretive authority over important questions,
62. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 215-16.
63. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 995-96 (2013).
64. See id. at 996-97.
65. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
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UARG departs notably from Chevron itself. Chevron, of course,
deemed the trigger for such delegation to be just the opposite:
statutory silence or ambiguity, not clarity.66 UARG’s reversal of the
terms of Chevron deference came, moreover, on the heels of a Term
in which the Court (also per Justice Scalia) had strenuously refused
to withhold Chevron deference for interpretations that concern the
scope of an agency’s regulatory authority.67 In City of Arlington v.
FCC, Justice Scalia had called out any distinction between “jurisdic-
tional” and “nonjurisdictional” agency interpretations—or, as he put
it, between “the big, important” interpretations and “[o]thers—hum-
drum, run-of-the-mill stuff”—as a “bogeyman, but ... dangerous all
the same.”68 Yet the UARG canon appears to embrace this very
distinction: gimlet-eyed scrutiny for “big, important” agency inter-
pretations, and a Chevron pass for the small stuff.69
Second, in disfavoring ambitious agency interpretations of “long-
extant” statutes, UARG privileges, in a new and very un-Chevron
way, stasis over change. Here, too, good evidence of UARG’s novelty
comes from Justice Scalia himself. In Smiley v. Citibank (South Da-
kota), Justice Scalia, on behalf of the unanimous Court, endorsed
Chevron deference for an ambitious agency interpretation of the
long-extant National Bank Act and affirmed a regulation of the
Comptroller of the Currency deeming credit card late fees to be
“interest” within the meaning of the Act and thus subject to state
regulation “by the laws of the State ... where the bank is located.”70
The upshot was that Citibank could charge late fees to customers
who lived in states where those fees were illegal.71 The Comptrol-
ler’s rule thus effectively loosened existing regulation of banks by
condoning deregulation by states in which the banks were located.
The Comptroller’s rule (and the Court’s endorsement of it) aided in
South Dakota’s capture of over $2.5 trillion in banking assets held
66. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
67. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868-71 (2013).
68. Id. at 1868, 1872.
69. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2449.
70. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1992)).
71. See id.
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in the state72 and in the swelling of credit card fees across the
country.73
In response to the argument that the Court should not defer to
the Comptroller’s brand-new interpretation of the 100-year-old Na-
tional Bank Act, Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he 100-year delay
makes no difference,” that “neither antiquity nor contemporaneity
with the statute is a condition of validity.”74 Rather, he observed, the
Court gives deference to agencies under Chevron “because of a
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambi-
guity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”75 The UARG canon, in
contrast to the deference shown in Smiley, codifies distrust of agen-
cies that find fresh authority in old statutes.76 Assuming that Smiley
itself is still good law, however, UARG’s new canon will apparently
be triggered only by agency action that works in one direction:
toward expansion, not contraction, of government regulation.77
Third, UARG’s canon does not follow from previous precedent em-
phasizing the significance of an interpretive issue in rejecting an
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. Here, it will be
useful first to identify two variations on the significance of an inter-
pretive question. An interpretive question can be economically
consequential and politically fraught—the kind of significance the
Court saw in UARG. An interpretive question can also be central to
a statutory plan—so central that to decide the interpretive question
in one way rather than another may fundamentally undermine the
statutory scheme. The Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. emphasizes the first version of significance,78 and
72. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGU-
LATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71, 71-72, 74 (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); S.D. Bank Assets Total $2.7 Trillion, SIOUX FALLS
BUS. J. (July 10, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.argusleader.com/story/news/business-journal/
2014/07/10/sd-bank-assets-total-27-trillion/12426911/ [https://perma.cc/734Z-TYQY].
73. See Robert M. Lawless, Debtor Nation, NATION (Oct. 16, 2008), https://www.thenation.
com/article/debtor-nation-0/ [https://perma.cc/GNW3-THTE].
74. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740.
75. Id. at 740-41.
76. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
77. See id.
78. See 529 U.S. 120, 137-39, 147 (2000).
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a line of cases beginning with MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. emphasizes the second.79
In UARG, the Court emphasized the first kind of significance and
ignored the second; sensibly, the Court did not suggest that the
proper interpretation of the provision triggering the stationary-
source permitting requirement of the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program was central to the operation of the
Clean Air Act.80 Indeed, if that provision were central to the reg-
ulatory scheme of the Clean Air Act, it would be hard to understand
the Court’s simultaneous decision to defer to EPA’s interpretive
judgment that the greenhouse gas emissions from the vast majority
of the sources at issue in the case should be brought into the
permitting program, because those sources were already in the
permitting program due to their emissions of other pollutants.81 If
the Court had deemed the permitting requirement of the PSD pro-
gram so central to the Clean Air Act that it would not defer to the
agency’s adjustment of the permitting requirement’s scope as it
pertained to sources, then it would have made little sense for the
Court to defer to the agency’s adjustment of its scope as it pertained
to pollutants. Economic and political importance, not centrality to
the statutory scheme, was the kind of significance the Court ad-
dressed in UARG.82
Although the Court in UARG found support for its emphasis on
economic and political significance in the earlier case of Brown &
Williamson,83 and thus its gesture toward this factor was not
entirely new, the UARG canon is a new, mutant strain of the
interpretive principle embraced in Brown & Williamson. In Brown
& Williamson, the Court cited the “economic and political signifi-
cance” of the Food and Drug Administration’s decision to regulate
tobacco and tobacco products in counseling hesitation in concluding
that Congress had delegated this decision to the agency.84 In that
case, the Court cited the significance of the issue at hand as but one
79. 512 U.S. 218, 229, 231 (1994); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
468-69, 469 n.1 (2001).
80. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2441-44.
81. See id. at 2448-49.
82. See id. at 2444.
83. See id.
84. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
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factor in its decision,85 and the Court concluded that the underlying
regulatory scheme—including statutes passed after the passage of
the statute the FDA was interpreting there—clearly precluded the
agency’s interpretation.86 The Court held, in other words, that the
underlying statute was clear at Chevron’s step one.87 In UARG, how-
ever, the Court used the significance of the interpretive issue as a
reason to deny deference to EPA at the second step of Chevron.88
Unlike the interpretive observation made in Brown & William-
son, the UARG canon poses two riddles for Congress itself. How can
Congress manage to “speak clearly” in assigning interpretive au-
thority to an agency, when it is in the midst of enacting an ambigu-
ous statutory provision? And how can Congress do so in enacting a
provision that it puts in deliberately broad terms so that future
problems—like climate change—can come within the statute’s
reach?89 These questions expose the true target of UARG’s new
canon: it is Congress, as much as it is the agency.
Moreover, to the extent that Brown & Williamson and like cases
can be explained in part by a norm of continuity in statutory in-
terpretation,90 UARG mutates that aspect of Brown & Williamson
as well. In the rule at issue in Brown & Williamson, the FDA delib-
erately rejected its longstanding judgment that the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not give the agency authority to regulate
tobacco.91 However, in the rule at issue in UARG, EPA was aiming
both to comply with its own longstanding interpretation of the Clean
Air Act’s PSD permitting program92 and to be faithful to the Su-
preme Court’s ruling that greenhouse gases were “air pollutants”
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.93 UARG disrupted,
rather than continued, consistent agency interpretations on the
85. See id. at 159.
86. See id. at 126.
87. See id. at 125-26.
88. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
89. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
90. See Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson (2000): The Norm
of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 335, 360-62 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011) (discussing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), and Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), in addition to Brown & Williamson).
91. See 529 U.S. at 125.
92. See William W. Buzbee, Anti-Regulatory Skewing and Political Choice in UARG, 39
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 69 (2015).
93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
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scope of the PSD program and the inclusion of greenhouse gases
within the regulatory fold.
The Court in UARG could claim a fresh seizure of power by EPA
only by fixing exclusively on the rule specifically at issue in that
case, the rule triggering PSD permitting requirements.94 Since EPA
had not previously triggered these requirements based on green-
house gas emissions alone, the Court characterized the triggering
rule as a new assertion of power.95 But EPA’s rule was also charac-
terized by continuity with the agency’s general approach to PSD
permitting and its specific approach to greenhouse gas regulation.96
To insist that an agency be wary of continuing a general regulatory
approach in one of its specific applications is to favor discontinu-
ity over continuity, and thus, the interpretive principle in UARG
breaks with prior precedent on the appropriate interpretive frame-
work for questions of great economic and political significance.
Finally, UARG ignores intervening precedent that should have
laid to rest any claim that there is an overarching, freestanding
interpretive canon that disfavors economically and politically ex-
pansive readings of long-extant laws. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Supreme Court rejected (over Justice Scalia’s dissent) EPA’s
decision that greenhouse gases were not “air pollutants” within the
meaning of the Clean Air Act.97 EPA had relied on FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. in adopting a narrow interpretation of the
“broadly worded grant of authority” in the Clean Air Act, citing the
“economic and political significance” of the “regulation of activities
that might lead to global climate change.”98 The Court would have
none of it.
Deeming EPA’s reliance on Brown & Williamson to be “mis-
placed,” the Court distinguished that case from Massachusetts on
94. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2435, 2437-38 (2014).
95. See id. at 2444-46.
96. See id. at 2435-37.
97. See 549 U.S. at 529 & n.26. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, the Court cited a different kind of statutory breadth in
observing, in dicta, that it would not have deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the Clean
Water Act even if it had found the relevant statutory language ambiguous. 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001). There, statutory breadth concerned the extension of statutory authority to “the outer
limits of Congress’ power,” not the economic or political significance of the underlying inter-
pretive issue. Id.
98. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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two grounds: the “extreme measures” that would have been required
if the FDA had classified tobacco products as “drugs” or “devices”
under the FDCA, and the “unbroken series of congressional enact-
ments that made sense only if adopted ‘against the backdrop of the
FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority
under the FDCA to regulate tobacco.’”99 Massachusetts should have
negated the general notion that statutory interpretation turns on
the economic or political importance of the issue at stake, and, even
more, it should have silenced the claim that the specific problem of
climate change should be subject to special interpretive rules.100
However, in UARG, the Court abruptly resuscitated the idea that
the sheer importance of an issue could be reason to reject an
agency’s interpretive choices, turned it into a reason to insist on
legislative clarity rather than ambiguity, and supplemented it with
the notion that the problem was especially pronounced if regulatory
authority under a longstanding statute grew rather than shrank.
B. King v. Burwell
1. The Canon
In King v. Burwell, the Court faced the question of whether the
Affordable Care Act’s provision making federal subsidies available
for insurance purchased on health-care exchanges “established by
the State[s]” precluded federal subsidies for insurance purchased on
a federal health-care exchange.101 The case came to the Court as one
that pitted four words in a massive statute against the remainder
of the statutory language and the avowed purposes and design of
the law as a whole, which would have been thwarted if subsidies
were available only on state-run exchanges.102 In addition, the Court
had before it the views of the Department of the Treasury, the
agency charged with administering the federal health-insurance
99. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530-31 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 135-37, 144 (2000)).
100. See Lisa Heinzerling, Thrower Keynote Address, The Role of Science in Massachusetts
v. EPA, 58 EMORY L.J. 411, 416 (2008) (discussing rejection of “climate exceptionalism”).
101. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487-88 (2015) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a) (2012)).
102. See id. at 2492-94.
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subsidies through the Internal Revenue Code.103 The Internal Rev-
enue Service, within the Department of the Treasury, had, after
notice and comment,104 promulgated a rule interpreting the Afford-
able Care Act to make federal subsidies available on the federal
health-care exchange.105
All of this could have made for a quite straightforward statutory
case. In an earlier age, when picayune textualism did not dominate
the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in the way it does
now, the answer could have been uncomplicated: the four words
would not have trumped every other indicator of the meaning of the
statute, and a decision that the statute, in full, clearly allowed fed-
eral subsidies for insurance purchased on federal exchanges would
have been unsurprising. But a six-Justice majority of the Court,
despite eventually ruling consistently with the government’s view
that federal subsidies were available on the federal exchange, found
the statute ambiguous and then refused to take the agency’s views
into account. 
Here is King’s key passage on the irrelevance of the agency’s
interpretation:
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we
often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron.
Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous
and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
This approach “is premised on the theory that a statute’s
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to
the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases,
however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s
key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year
and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people.
Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is
thus a question of deep “economic and political significance” that
is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so
103. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012); id. § 7805(a).
104. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012)
(to be codified at 26 U.S.C. pt. 1).
105. See id.; 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014).
1956 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1933
expressly. It is especially unlikely that Congress would have
delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in
crafting health insurance policy of this sort. This is not a case for
the IRS.106
The Court thus declined to apply Chevron at all; it took the ques-
tion away from the agency altogether and decided it for itself.107 In
the end, the Court’s decision affirming the availability of federal
subsidies on federal exchanges amounted to a roundabout way of
coming to a sensible conclusion based on the entirety of the statute
and its context, rather than on a bare four words in the law—a
conclusion that the Court could have reached through application
of Chevron’s famous first step. But all six Justices in the majority
signed on to the principle that the Chevron framework simply did
not apply.108
The interpretive principle embraced in King can be stated as fol-
lows: when an agency charged with administering an ambiguous
statutory provision answers a question of great economic and politi-
cal significance, the question is central to the underlying statutory
regime, and the Court believes the agency is not an expert in the
matter, the Court may “hesitate” to apply the Chevron framework
at all in determining statutory meaning.109 Note the complexity of
this interpretive principle, with its five different features: ambiguity
in the statute, economic and political significance, centrality to the
statutory regime, the interpreting agency’s status as an expert in
the field, and complete withdrawal of the Chevron framework. 
This combination of features is both normative and new.
106. 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (citations omitted) (first quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); and then quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court in King also embraced an interpretive
approach that looked beyond the four disputed words and considered the broad purposes of
the Affordable Care Act in finding that federal subsidies were indeed available on federal
exchanges. See id. at 2492-96. Here, I am focusing on the portion of the opinion ousting the
Chevron framework.
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2. Normativity
The Court styles its interpretive principle in King as a description
of likely congressional behavior (“had Congress wished to ... it surely
would have”; “[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress would have
delegated this decision to the IRS”), but it is squarely normative.110
As I noted above, the most direct route to the Court’s ultimate result
would have been to find that the Affordable Care Act, as a whole,
unambiguously provided for federal subsidies on federal exchanges.
Addressing the interpretive question at Chevron’s step one would
have avoided the circuitous path the Court followed instead, finding
first, that the statute was ambiguous; second, that Chevron did not
apply; and, third, that federal subsidies were indeed available on
federal exchanges. What did Chief Justice Roberts gain by proceed-
ing sinuously rather than directly? 
A possible answer comes from the Chief Justice’s extraordinary
dissent, just a Term before, in City of Arlington v. FCC.111 Recall
that this is the case in which Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
concluded that Chevron applied even to an agency’s interpretation
of a provision setting out the scope of its own jurisdiction.112 Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, vehemently
dissented, taking the occasion to launch an attack on the scope and
power of administrative agencies in contemporary government.113
Allowing as how it would be “a bit much” (just “a bit much”) to
describe the “growing power of the administrative state,” including
the Chevron framework, as “the very definition of tyranny,” the
Chief Justice nevertheless made clear that he viewed federal
agencies’ “poking into every nook and cranny of daily life” as a
threat to the constitutional order.114 He would have insisted that a
court “not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, that
the agency is entitled to deference.”115 His approach would effec-
tively have had a court decide whether an agency is entitled to
110. Id. at 2489.
111. See 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 1874 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. In Part II, we will return to the possibility that one or more of the power canons
could be justified on constitutional grounds.
115. Id. at 1877.
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deference by undertaking a “provision-by-provision, ambiguity-by-
ambiguity” analysis of whether Congress delegated interpretive
authority to an agency over the particular question before the
court.116 It is not hard to see how the Court’s roundabout route in
King satisfies some of the Chief Justice’s larger goals as stated in
his dissent in City of Arlington.117 When King is analyzed against
the backdrop of City of Arlington, the normative foundations of the
interpretive principle announced in King become plain: the ouster
of the Chevron framework in King makes forward progress on the
Chief Justice’s evident desire to trim the power of administrative
agencies.
The normative basis of King’s interpretive principle is also evi-
dent in the interaction between statutory ambiguity and the ouster
of the Chevron framework. In King, the Court found that the central
statutory provision, containing the key words “established by the
State[s],” was ambiguous.118 The Court’s suggestion that Congress
could have been expected to have spoken more clearly if it had
wanted to give interpretive authority to the agency assumes that
Congress knew about the ambiguity it was creating and intention-
ally decided to leave it in the statute. Yet the interpretive conun-
drum posed by the four words “established by the State[s]” was
created precisely because Congress appeared not to have been
aware of it.119 Therefore, as in UARG, the Court’s interpretive ap-
proach in King is effectively an instruction to Congress to speak
plainly when it writes ambiguous statutory provisions. The instruc-
tion is not just normative, but nonsensical; it can only be understood
as an instruction to Congress not to speak ambiguously at all in
certain circumstances.
The earlier discussion of the novelty of the interpretive principle
embraced in UARG helps to explain why another feature of the King
canon, the economic and political significance of the interpretive
issue, is also normative. In that discussion, we have already seen
several examples of statutes in which Congress failed to clearly
answer questions of large economic and political significance, such
as whether “interest” under the National Bank Act included credit
116. Hickman, supra note 38, at 61; see also City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
117. For a similar perspective on King, see Hickman, supra note 38, at 62-63.
118. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2491-92 (2015) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)(2012)).
119. Id.
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card late fees120 and whether “sources” under the stationary-source
permitting program of the Clean Air Act included only individual
pollution-emitting devices and equipment or also included all such
devices and equipment within a facility.121 These, too, were ques-
tions of large economic and political significance, and yet, in ad-
dressing them, the Court did not suggest that Congress would have
spoken more clearly about the agency’s power to decide them if it
had wanted to confer such power. In other words, in emphasizing
economic and political importance in King, the Court is not calling
upon a general presumption that Congress speaks clearly when it
delegates big questions to agencies; many prior cases expose the
factual inaccuracy of such a presumption. Instead, the Court is
carving out a category of cases as to which it simply will not tolerate
ambiguity.
The same goes for the Court’s assertion in King that “[t]his is not
a case for the IRS.”122 The Court asserts that it is “especially un-
likely” that Congress would have delegated the relevant interpretive
issue to the IRS123—but that is exactly what Congress did. Congress
gave the IRS the authority to issue rules with the force of law under
provisions of the Tax Code, including the provision at issue in
King.124 Moreover, in a previous decision, Chief Justice Roberts had
written for a unanimous Court in holding that Chevron deference
applied “with full force in the tax context.”125 In King, too, Congress
had spoken to the IRS’s authority, but the Court could not hear it.
This is an act of resistance, not fealty.
This is not to say that all aspects of King’s interpretive principle,
taken separately, come from somewhere outside the underlying stat-
ute. In particular, as an intuitive matter, it seems fair to assume
that Congress would not construct an elaborate statutory frame-
work that could be undone by ambiguity in peripheral statutory
provisions, ambiguity that could then be exploited by an agency
120. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737 (1996).
121. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
122. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
123. Id.
124. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and
regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal
revenue”).
125. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
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unsympathetic to the underlying statutory framework. This is, I
believe, the insight behind Justice Scalia’s opinion in MCI,126 and it
is also one principle underlying his opinion for a unanimous Court
in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.127 In Whitman,
the Court held that the Clean Air Act unambiguously prohibited
EPA from considering costs in setting the standards at the heart
of the statute, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS).128 Many provisions of the statute explicitly called for
consideration of costs, but the provision instructing EPA how to set
the NAAQS did not.129 Justice Scalia recognized that the consider-
ation of costs could undo the protective nature of the NAAQS, thus
defeating the underlying statutory scheme.130 He concluded that
peripheral provisions of the statute should not be interpreted to
undermine the health- and environment-protecting thrust of the
NAAQS.131 He captured his reasoning in a metaphor that has gone
on to great fame: Congress does not, he observed, “hide elephants in
mouseholes”132—that is, it does not adjust the central details of a
statute in ancillary provisions. This principle at least gestures to
Congress’s likely behavior and desires, and it has intuitive merit.
But this principle is just one thread of the interpretive tapestry
created in King.
3. Novelty
The King v. Burwell canon is also new. The Court had, in the
Chevron era, never before put the Chevron framework entirely to
the side in the circumstances presented in King: an interpretation
of a statute deemed ambiguous, arrived at after notice-and-comment
rulemaking, by the agency charged by the statute with making rules
126. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). Note,
however, that in MCI the concept of centrality was embedded in the precise statutory term
at issue there, “modify.” Id. at 225. The Court held that this term did not include fundamental
changes, and thus if—as the Court held it was—the FCC’s change to the filed-tariff regime
was fundamental, it was inconsistent with the statute. See id. at 225, 227-32.
127. See 531 U.S. 457, 468-69, 469 n.1 (2001).
128. See id. at 470.
129. See id. at 466-68.
130. See id. at 465-66.
131. See id. at 468.
132. Id.
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to implement the provision interpreted. Prior to King, the circum-
stances upsetting the Chevron framework had been ones in which
either the relevant statute did not give the agency authority to set
rules with the force of law or the agency had not used that authority
in the circumstances under review.133 These conditions did not hold
in King. In that sense, the interpretive framework of King is a com-
plete novelty.
In citing economic and political importance, the Court draws on
both Brown & Williamson and UARG. In King, however, the mutant
strain of Brown & Williamson created in UARG is active. That is, in
King, as in UARG, the Court is instructing Congress to speak more
clearly when it enacts an ambiguous statute.134 This mutant strain
is not brand new, given UARG, but it is not exactly venerable.
Moreover, UARG’s interpretive principle rested in part on the age
of the underlying statute in expressing skepticism about the agen-
cy’s interpretive authority.135 In King, the statute was very recent.136
Neither very old, nor very new, statutes are safe from the Court’s
new canons. 
As discussed previously, the Court had in several prior cases
found the centrality of an interpretive question to a statutory
scheme important in determining its approach to the question.137
Specifically, the Court had used the centrality of a question to avoid
a conclusion that a statute allowed an interpretive result that would
undermine the statutory scheme, holding in those cases that the
statutes were unambiguous at Chevron’s step one.138 As discussed,
this would have been the most direct route to the ruling in King as
well.
The perceived expertise of the interpreting agency also had some
basis in prior precedent. In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court found that
Congress had not implicitly, through the ambiguity of the phrase
“legitimate medical purpose,” given the Attorney General the au-
thority to criminalize the administration of federally regulated
133. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
134. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015).
135. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
136. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
137. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
138. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 547, 471 (2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225, 231-32 (1994).
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drugs for use in assisted suicide.139 The Court’s decision in Gonzales
had many facets, one of which was the Court’s conclusion that the
Attorney General’s lack of medical expertise made it implausible to
find, in the ambiguity of the statute, a delegation of interpretive
authority to the Attorney General.140 In King, in contrast, Congress
had explicitly given the Department of the Treasury the authority
to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary” to implement
tax provisions, including the Affordable Care Act’s provisions on tax
credits.141 The Court’s suggestion that, nevertheless, the IRS (in the
Department of the Treasury) could not be given this authority
because it was not an expert is a new development in the law:
Congress must, it seems, not only speak clearly about its intended
interpretive delegatee, but also pick the right one.142
The complex interpretive principle embraced in King is novel
primarily for its ouster of the Chevron framework. The other ele-
ments of the principle—the economic and political significance of the
interpretive question, the centrality of that question to the underly-
ing statutory framework, and the agency’s expert capacity on the
relevant issue—had, individually, been presaged in prior cases
(although those cases, too, were of recent vintage).143 They had never
before, however, been combined in one big, Chevron-ousting
package.
C. Michigan v. EPA
1. The Canon
The last in the new trio of power canons addresses not the sheer
importance or centrality of the relevant interpretive question, but
the substantive content of the agency’s interpretive choice.
139. 546 U.S. 243, 265-67 (2006).
140. See id. at 266-67.
141. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(g) (2012); id. § 7805(a); see also Leandra Lederman & Joseph C.
Dugan, King v. Burwell : What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72,
78-79 (contrasting King and Gonzales in same way).
142. The Court in King appeared unaware of—or indifferent to—the fact that the IRS
administers many government programs that go beyond the IRS’s traditional revenue-raising
function. See Hickman, supra note 38, at 66-69.
143. See id. at 66 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 53-58 (2011)).
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In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court considered whether EPA
had acted unreasonably in refusing to consider costs in determining
that regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary”
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which regulates toxic air
pollutants such as mercury.144 The Court held, 5-4, that EPA had
erred in choosing not to consider costs in deciding whether to
regulate power plants under section 112.145 Justice Scalia wrote for
the majority, Justice Kagan for the dissenters.146
The point of agreement in Michigan v. EPA between Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s dissent—and the focus
here—was the proposition that an agency may not, unless Congress
signals otherwise, impose regulatory costs without taking those
costs into account. Both the majority and dissent used this general
proposition as a starting point for their analysis of the specific
statutory regime at issue in Michigan v. EPA—in Justice Scalia’s
case, as a platform for rejecting EPA’s refusal to consider costs in
deciding whether to regulate at all, and in Justice Kagan’s case, as
a prologue to explaining why EPA did not run afoul of this principle
in regulating power plants under section 112.147
Justice Scalia opened his analysis by quoting Supreme Court
precedents calling for “reasoned decisionmaking,” logic and ration-
ality, and “consideration of the relevant factors” in agency deci-
sions.148 Notably, the cases he cited at the outset—Allentown Mack
and State Farm—did not involve statutory interpretation, but
instead involved the scope of arbitrary and capricious review of the
merits of agency decisions.149 Justice Scalia again invoked ration-
ality in explaining why “the phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’
requires at least some attention to cost[:] [o]ne would not say that
it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of
dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or
144. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).
145. See id. at 2702, 2712.
146. See id. at 2699 (syllabus).
147. See id. at 2712 (majority opinion); id. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2706 (majority opinion) (first quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998); and then quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
149. See id. These species of judicial review of agency action can be very similar in
operation, but the Court has cautioned that they are distinct analytic frameworks. See
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 & n.7 (2011).
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environmental benefits.”150 Justice Scalia conceded that not all
statutory references to judgments of appropriateness and necessity
entail consideration of costs, but, he believed, statutory provisions
triggering regulation are distinctive:
Section 7412(n)(1)(A) directs EPA to determine whether “reg-
ulation is appropriate and necessary.” ... Agencies have long
treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether
to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that
reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the
advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions. It also
reflects the reality that “too much wasteful expenditure devoted
to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources
available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious)
problems.” Against the backdrop of this established administra-
tive practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an
administrative agency to determine whether “regulation is
appropriate and necessary” as an invitation to ignore cost.151
This passage marked the majority’s embrace of a general propo-
sition that goes beyond section 112 of the Clean Air Act: agencies’
purportedly “established administrative practice” of considering
costs in deciding whether to regulate has, according to Justice
Scalia, made the interpretive default one in which agencies must
consider cost in order to engage in “reasonable regulation.”152
Justice Kagan defended her embrace of this general proposition
in strikingly similar terms. Here is her analysis of this point, in full:
Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly impor-
tant—factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise,
an agency acts unreasonably in establishing “a standard-setting
process that ignore[s] economic considerations.” At a minimum,
that is because such a process would “threaten[] to impose
massive costs far in excess of any benefit.” And accounting for
costs is particularly important “in an age of limited resources
available to deal with grave environmental problems, where too
much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well
150. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
151. Id. at 2707-08 (citations omitted) (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S.
208, 233 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
152. Id.
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mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively
with other (perhaps more serious) problems.” As the Court
notes, that does not require an agency to conduct a formal cost-
benefit analysis of every administrative action. But (absent con-
trary indication from Congress) an agency must take costs into
account in some manner before imposing significant regulatory
burdens.153
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kagan would have upheld EPA’s
rule because she concluded that the agency had adequately taken
costs into account in the regulatory stages subsequent to its de-
termination that regulation of power plants was “appropriate and
necessary.”154 She discerned cost considerations in the statute’s fo-
cus on the best performers in the relevant source category, in the
agency’s categorization and subcategorization of power plants, in
the compliance options the agency offered to regulated sources, in
the agency’s general declination to set emissions limits beyond those
associated with the best technology, and in the agency’s preparation
of a cost-benefit analysis pursuant to presidential executive orders
and in its submission of the rule to the White House for regulatory
review.155 It was only the majority’s “blinkered” approach, focusing
just on the first stage of the regulatory process, that—she argued—
allowed the majority to conclude that EPA had unlawfully and
irrationally refused to consider costs.156
Despite Justice Kagan’s disagreement with the majority, how-
ever, her embrace of the presumed relevance of costs to regulatory
decisions was plain: “I agree with the majority—let there be no
doubt about this—that EPA’s power plant regulation would be
unreasonable if ‘[t]he Agency gave cost no thought at all.’”157
Notably, her description of the ways in which costs were embedded
in EPA’s decision on power plants overstated the role of costs in
determining the scope and shape of the regulation of power plants
153. Id. at 2716-17 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first
quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); then quoting Entergy 556 U.S.
at 234 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and then quoting id. at 233).
154. Id. at 2726.
155. See id. at 2718-22.
156. Id. at 2714-15.
157. Id. at 2714 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2706 (majority opinion)).
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under section 112.158 For example, she assumed that any existing
deployment of control technologies for hazardous air pollutants at
these sources must have been cost-sensitive and profit-driven,159 but
they were more likely driven by regulatory initiatives that were
less cost-sensitive than she imagined and certainly not profit-driven.
Justice Kagan, in other words, not only accepted a presumption
that regulation must be cost-sensitive, but also implicitly insisted
upon a cost-sensitive regime that is more cost-sensitive than the
actual program established by section 112.
In sum, in Michigan v. EPA, nine Justices agreed that an ad-
ministrative agency must—unless Congress provides otherwise—
consider the costs of regulation before imposing regulatory stan-
dards. Five Justices thought this principle so robust that it required
an agency to consider costs even before starting down the path
toward regulation.160 Four Justices would have allowed an agency
to take steps toward regulation without considering costs, so long as
it brings costs into the journey at some point.161 No Justice explain-
ed exactly what a proper consideration of costs would entail.162 But
all agreed that such an accounting—whatever it was—was, as a
matter of law and basic rationality, required.
Here, too, the Court’s new canon is both normative and new.
2. Normativity
The canon is frankly normative. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Kagan drew on what they apparently regarded as unimpeachable
observations about regulatory rationality in asserting their new
interpretive principle. Yet the appropriate role of costs in regulatory
policy has been one of the most contentious issues in defining the
scope and limits of the contemporary administrative state.163
Moreover, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Kagan even purported
158. See id.
159. Id. at 2719.
160. See id. at 2702, 2711 (majority opinion).
161. See id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 2711 (majority opinion) (declining to specify how EPA must take costs into
account); id. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that an agency “must take costs into
account in some manner”).
163. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial
and Agency Discretion, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 87-88 (2016).
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to rely on descriptions of the kind of language Congress would likely
use in order to allow or require a cost-blind regulatory determina-
tion.
Instead, they supported their new interpretive principle by draw-
ing on snippets from policy-driven, solo opinions in prior cases.
Justices Scalia and Kagan both cited to and quoted from one pas-
sage in a solo opinion by Justice Breyer in Entergy Corp. v. Riv-
erkeeper, Inc.164 In Entergy, Justice Breyer concurred in part with
and dissented in part to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for the
Court holding that EPA reasonably interpreted a provision of the
Clean Water Act to allow the agency to weigh costs against benefits
in regulating the cooling water intake structures of power plants.165
In the part of Justice Breyer’s opinion to which Justices Scalia and
Kagan refer, Justice Breyer was working hard to explain that the
relevant provision of the Clean Water Act does not prohibit a limited
comparison of costs and benefits.166 This is a strange reference for
the proposition that agencies must consider costs before they reg-
ulate. Justice Breyer’s opinion in Entergy supports, at most, the idea
that an agency faced with open-ended statutory language may—but
need not—decide to balance costs and benefits to some extent.
Indeed, this is the very position embraced by Justice Scalia’s own
majority opinion in Entergy (not cited by either Justice Scalia or
Justice Kagan in Michigan).167 Notably, moreover, Justice Breyer
himself had cited no source, legal or otherwise, for his concerns
about “massive costs” and “wasteful expenditure.”168
To the solo opinion by Justice Breyer, Justice Kagan added a
citation to a solo opinion by Justice Powell.169 In his partial con-
currence in Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute (The Benzene Case), Justice Powell argued that the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) should be interpreted to
require the agency charged with implementing it, the Occupational
164. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708; id. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
165. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 230 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
166. See id. at 233-34.
167. See id. at 224 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 233-34 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), “to determine that the
economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the
expected benefits.”170 Believing that OSHA’s approach of considering
economic effects only in order to determine whether an occupational
health standard was “feasible” was inadequate, Justice Powell
wanted the Court to hold that an occupational health standard
violated the statute if it called for “expenditures wholly dispropor-
tionate to the expected health and safety benefits.”171 In a subse-
quent case, however, the Supreme Court rejected Justice Powell’s
approach and accepted OSHA’s feasibility-based approach.172 Justice
Powell’s opinion in The Benzene Case has no present legal signifi-
cance, and it—like Justice Breyer’s quoted opinion—cited no
authority, legal or otherwise, for the proposition for which it is
quoted.
Citation to fragments from one or two partial concurrences, nei-
ther joined by any other Justice, one explicitly rejected by the Court
in a later case, makes for paltry legal precedent. Indeed, it is
scarcely a legal argument at all. And, most important for present
purposes, it is not an argument based on predictions about congres-
sional behavior or preferences. It is an argument based on the Jus-
tices’ own judgments about sensible regulatory policy.
The Court in Michigan thus created another normative canon of
statutory interpretation, one with potentially large implications for
the balance of powers among the branches of government. The new
canon not only chooses sides in a longstanding debate over the
proper content and thrust of regulatory policy, but also enthrones
the courts as the arbiters of this debate. With Michigan v. EPA, the
Court has added another item to the list of canons that trump the
deference ordinarily due an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statute under Chevron and, even more problematically, has schooled
Congress on the clarity it must achieve if it wants to rule out the
consideration of costs in the implementation of a regulatory regime.
170. 448 U.S. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
171. Id.
172. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 495 n.4, 540-41 (1981).
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3. Novelty
The canon embraced in Michigan v. EPA is also new. The Justices
had never before formed a united front, in this substantive direc-
tion, on this fundamental issue. Indeed, in the prior case closest in
substance to Michigan, the Court had unanimously ruled in the
opposite direction, deciding that an agency could not consider costs
in setting national standards that were expected to cost billions of
dollars.173 As noted above, the Justices had previously divided over
the role of costs in the regulatory process even when the question
was whether the relevant agency was allowed—rather than re-
quired—to consider costs in regulating.174 One may cite differences
among the cases in terms of statutory language and context, but
there is no denying the philosophical shift reflected in the Court’s
newfound unanimity in Michigan v. EPA.175
With UARG, King, and Michigan, the Supreme Court has intro-
duced three new canons of statutory interpretation. The power can-
ons reflect the Court’s own views about the kinds of interpretive
issues that require an extra measure of clarity from Congress and
an extra dose of reticence from administrative agencies. I argue
next that these views are of a piece with several Justices’ anxieties
about the constitutional status of the modern administrative state.
These anxieties have not matured into constitutional rulings on
behalf of a majority of the Court, but they may have found a non-
constitutional home in the power canons.
II. AVOIDANCE COPING
Until very recently, the constitutional validity of the administra-
tive state seemed secure. Only fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected a challenge to the Clean Air Act based on the
nondelegation doctrine.176 The D.C. Circuit had held that EPA had
violated the nondelegation doctrine by interpreting the statute’s
173. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 & n.3 (2001).
174. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593, 1610 (2014);
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009).
175. I return to this point in more detail in Part III when I discuss the instability generated
by the Court’s new canon.
176. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-73.
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provisions for setting national air quality standards not to allow the
agency to consider economic costs or technological feasibility in set-
ting those standards.177 These standards are highly consequential,
imposing costs that run into billions of dollars and requiring major
adjustments in central economic sectors such as energy and trans-
portation.178 Yet the Supreme Court had no trouble brushing back
the constitutional challenge to EPA’s approach.179 The Court em-
phasized the breadth of the statutory delegations it had previously
upheld and rejected the lower court’s renovation of the nondel-
egation doctrine in condemning the agency for failing to curtail its
own discretion under a statute that itself did not violate the
nondelegation doctrine.180 As the Court—with Justice Scalia writing
for the majority—observed, allowing an agency to correct an overly
broad statute would itself violate the nondelegation doctrine.181
In determining the constitutional validity of the modern adminis-
trative state, the nondelegation doctrine is the big one. The only
doctrine that could come close, in terms of damage to the premises
underlying the administrate state, would be the substantive due
process theory embraced and then abandoned in the first half of the
twentieth century.182 With the nondelegation doctrine in a state of
desuetude and economic substantive due process discredited, the
two constitutional doctrines that might have posed a broad threat
to the administrative state seem to have been taken out of service.
Nevertheless, in recent years, several Justices have expressed
large-scale, constitutionally inspired anxieties about the modern
administrative state.183 The anxieties are potent enough, and broad-
ranging enough, that they must derive from equally potent and
broad constitutional doctrines—such as the nondelegation doctrine
or the doctrine of economic substantive due process. The problem for
177. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
178. See Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air
Quality Standards at 23, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-
1440).
179. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-73.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 473.
182. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
183. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(railing against the practice of deference to agency determinations).
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the Justices, however, is that they do not have a majority for revi-
talizing these doctrines. The power canons may have sprung from
a desire to avoid statutory interpretations that make the Justices
constitutionally anxious. Understood this way, however, the power
canons would reflect a deeply problematic variation on the already
problematic canon of constitutional avoidance.
A. Constitutional Anxieties
In the past several years, several Justices have launched broad,
strident, and constitutionally inflected attacks on the administra-
tive state.184 These attacks, however, have appeared in concurring
or dissenting opinions that have not attracted a majority of the
Justices.185 Where broad objections have led to majority opinions,
they have been in cases raising legal issues that have nothing to do
with the Court’s embrace of the power canons.186
In City of Arlington v. FCC, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Jus-
tices Alito and Kennedy, dissented from the majority’s ruling that
an agency could receive deference under Chevron even for its inter-
pretation of the scope of its own jurisdiction.187 Roberts began his
dissent with a lengthy preamble, offered by way of “background” to
the specific dispute before the Court.188 His discussion is highly
suggestive but ultimately inconclusive. He laments the combination
of legislative, executive, and judicial powers within administrative
agencies; the substantive reach of the agencies into “almost every
aspect of daily life”; the numerosity of agencies and their independ-
ence from presidential control; and the “reams” and “thousands of
pages” of regulations.189 He shares Judge Friendly’s concern that
congressional delegations to agencies often express “a mood rather
than a message.”190 
The latter observation equally applies to the Chief Justice’s dis-
sent. He expresses great worry about the administrative state and
184. See, e.g., id.
185. See, e.g., id.
186. See infra note 205.
187. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1877-79.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1879 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1311 (1962)).
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strongly hints that his concern is constitutionally inspired, but he
does not come out and say that the entire structure, or even a large
part of it, is unconstitutional, or even name the constitutional
source of his anxiety.191 Indeed, even on the discrete issue presented
in that case, he intimates, but does not clearly assert, that deferring
to an agency without first determining that Congress has delegated
interpretive authority to the agency on the specific matter at issue
betrays the Court’s responsibility to “police the boundary” between
the judicial and executive branches.192 Nevertheless, it is fair to say
that the “mood” reflected in the dissent is decidedly unhappy.
Justice Alito was a bit clearer about the constitutional origins of
his concurrence—joined by no other Justice—in Department of Tran-
sportation v. Association of American Railroads.193 There, he wrote
that, if the arbitrator who resolves disputes between the Federal
Railway Administration and Amtrak over standards for passenger
railroad services may be a private person, the underlying law “is
unconstitutional.”194 Justice Alito suggested that delegation of legis-
lative authority to private parties necessarily violates the nondel-
egation doctrine.195 He also appeared uncomfortable with the
Court’s general failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine “with
more vigilance.”196 He cited the majority opinion in City of Arlington
for the proposition that the Court’s leniency with respect to
nondelegation could be explained by the fact that “other branches
of Government have vested powers of their own that can be used in
ways that resemble lawmaking”—but then he seemed to character-
ize this reasoning as “a fig leaf of constitutional justification.”197
Combining this concurrence with his agreement with Chief Justice
Roberts’s vehement dissent in City of Arlington, it seems fair to
predict that Justice Alito would welcome revitalization of the non-
delegation doctrine.
191. See id. at 1877.
192. Id. at 1886.
193. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234-35 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 1237. On remand, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 violated due process by granting regulatory author-
ity to Amtrak, which the court characterized as a self-interested economic competitor of the
plaintiffs. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
195. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1237-38.
196. Id. at 1237.
197. Id.
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Justice Thomas’s views are plainer still. Over the years, he has
written a series of separate opinions making clear that he views
much of the regulatory apparatus as unconstitutional. In Whitman
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., his concurring opinion
suggested that perhaps the longstanding “intelligible principle”
requirement for legislative delegations to administrative agencies
was not sufficient “to prevent all cessions of legislative power,” and
that “there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet
the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the
decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”198 He left the
issue for “a future day,” however, since no party had asked the
Court to reconsider its precedents on nondelegation.199
That future day has come for Justice Thomas. In recent Terms,
Justice Thomas has given full voice to his belief that many features
of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, he concluded
that the intelligible principle test “largely abdicates our duty to
enforce that prohibition.”200 He advocated a “return to the original
understanding of the ... legislative power,” one that would “require
that the Federal Government create generally applicable rules of
private conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legis-
lative process.”201 In addition, he has argued that “Chevron defer-
ence raises serious separation-of-powers questions” under Articles
I and III of the Constitution202 and that the practice of deferring to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations was “constitution-
ally infirm from the start.”203 
None of the opinions I have just described convinced a majority
of the Court. The opinions by Justices Alito and Thomas were solo
opinions. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington was
joined by two other Justices.204 All together, four of the Court’s
current Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito—have joined or written at least one of the
198. 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 487.
200. 135 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
201. Id.
202. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
203. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
204. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 132 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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opinions expressing discomfort with the current scope and structure
of government. As of yet, therefore, the Court does not have a major-
ity to undertake a broad renovation of constitutional doctrine, and
it did not even have a majority to do this at the time the power
canons were created.205 The discontented rumblings from four cur-
rent Justices, however, and the strong message of the power canons
themselves cannot but make one wonder whether the Justices’
dissatisfaction with the power of administrative agencies has found
its way into statutory interpretation. Next, I examine whether the
power canons can be justified as applications of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance. I conclude they cannot.
B. Constitutional Avoidance
None of the cases creating the power canons explicitly connects
the canons to a constitutional theory. The one possible, tiny hint at
a constitutional link for one of the canons appears in Justice Scalia’s
opinion in UARG, in which he cites The Benzene Case as one of
several sources for the principle that Congress must speak clearly
if it wishes to delegate to an agency interpretive power over a mat-
ter of great economic and political significance.206 One of the pages
205. This is not to say the majority has been passive. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the Court held that the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board was unconstitutional insofar as its members were insulated from
removal by two layers of job protection. 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion for a 5-4 majority purports to extend no further than cases in which this unusual
double layer of protection exists, but at the same time, much of its language would suggest
that independent agencies are constitutionally problematic because they are not accountable
to the President. See id. at 483-84, 495-96, 499. Moreover, cases working their way through
the lower courts raise the question whether the system of administrative law judges in the
independent agencies violates the separation of powers because the judges are insulated by
two layers of job protection. See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015). 
For present purposes, however, PCAOB and cases following it are of little moment. The
agencies put on a tight leash in UARG, King, and Michigan are executive agencies, headed
by officials subject to removal by the President. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2704; King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2432
(2014). The rules that were undone in UARG and Michigan were subject to review and
approval by officials in the White House. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2715 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2434. If one is looking for a constitutional
basis for the power canons, in other words, one will not find it in PCAOB.
206. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (citing Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
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he cites from The Benzene Case contains the plurality opinion’s fa-
mous paragraph suggesting that a delegation to the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration of power to regulate toxic sub-
stances in workplaces without an initial quantification and finding
of a “significant” risk “would make such a ‘sweeping delegation of
legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional under the
Court’s reasoning in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.”207
In citing The Benzene Case, Justice Scalia may have coyly ges-
tured toward a constitutional basis for his new canon, but he did not
explicitly assert a constitutional claim or even suggest that avoiding
such a claim through a narrowing interpretation would be appropri-
ate. Moreover, no party in the three cases I am discussing here
argued that Congress could not delegate to the agencies the power
to make the interpretive choices they did. The sole question was
whether Congress had done so.
Is it possible to defend the power canons on constitutional
grounds even though the Court itself did not attempt to do so? In
particular, does the nondelegation doctrine supply a constitutional
basis for the power canons’ shift of interpretive authority from the
agencies to the courts? Given the desuetude of the nondelegation
doctrine as a lever for direct invalidation of federal statutes, such an
argument would need to use the nondelegation doctrine as a lever
for narrowing federal statutes to avoid a constitutional issue.208 The
power canons, in other words, would need to function as canons of
avoidance in order to claim a constitutional foundation in the non-
delegation doctrine.
The problem is that there was no constitutional problem to avoid
in the cases embracing the power canons. Characterizing the in-
terpretive principle embraced in King as one designed to avoid a
nondelegation problem would be especially strange.209 What un-
constitutional result, exactly, would the Court have been avoiding
in declining to defer to the IRS? The IRS reached the same result
the Court eventually reached, albeit through a less circuitous
207. 448 U.S. at 646 (citations omitted).
208. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 223-24.
209. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
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route.210 Once the Court was finished with its analysis of the
Affordable Care Act, it was plain that there was only one reasonable
answer to the question of whether federal subsidies were available
on federal exchanges, and that answer was yes.211 It is very hard to
imagine a nondelegation problem created by a statute that, alto-
gether, made just one interpretive result reasonable. The Chief Jus-
tice may still have been worked up over the constitutional status of
the administrative state, as he was in City of Arlington, but King
was not an appropriate outlet for his pique.
 Nor does the nondelegation doctrine support the canon embraced
in UARG. The closest case, as Justice Scalia may have recognized,212
is The Benzene Case. In The Benzene Case, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) had issued a regulation setting
a permissible exposure limit for benzene in the workplace.213 The
agency had identified benzene as a human carcinogen for which a
safe threshold could not be identified; thus, in accordance with its
policy on carcinogens, the agency had assumed that benzene could
cause cancer at any nonzero level.214 The agency thus set the work-
place standard at the lowest level it found to be economically and
technologically feasible for the affected industries.215 In the para-
graph cited by Justice Scalia in UARG, a plurality of the Court was
explaining why it concluded that the agency needed another step in
its analysis: a quantitative finding that a risk was “significant.”216
Without such a finding, the plurality worried that a finding that a
substance was probably a human carcinogen would justify “perva-
sive regulation” that might “impose enormous costs that might
produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”217 Here, Justice Stevens
spoke only for himself and three other Justices, and even so, his
opinion intimated only the possibility of a constitutional issue.
Any actual constitutional implications of Justice Stevens’s opinion
in The Benzene Case faded fast. In a sequel to The Benzene Case,
210. See id. at 2488.
211. See id. at 2496.
212. See supra note 206.
213. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
214. See id. at 623-25.
215. See id. at 637.
216. See id. at 646.
217. Id. at 645.
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American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (Cotton
Dust), the Court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHAct) did not permit OSHA to balance costs and benefits in
setting workplace standards for harmful substances, relegating
constitutional worries to a terse footnote.218 The Court brushed off
Justice Rehnquist’s charge that the OSHAct permitted OSHA to
choose among three very different understandings of its regulatory
authority and thus violated the nondelegation doctrine by simply
noting that “this would not be the first time that more than one
interpretation of a statute had been argued.”219 And, as discussed
above, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., a
unanimous Court rejected the claim that the Clean Air Act unlaw-
fully delegated legislative power to EPA by directing it to set
national air quality standards without regard to economic cost or
technological feasibility.220 After Cotton Dust and American Truck-
ing, it is no longer plausible to argue that the sheer breadth of
regulatory authority—in terms of either the agency’s choice among
decision-making frameworks or the economic effect of the regulatory
policy in question—truly poses a nondelegation problem. To bend
statutory interpretation to avoid a nonexistent constitutional
problem would be to go beyond even the constitutional penumbra
into territory with no landmarks at all. 
Whitman even more clearly separates the interpretive principle
embraced in Michigan from the nondelegation doctrine. The ques-
tion the Court faced in Whitman was simply a variant of the
question faced in Michigan: Was it lawful for EPA not to consider
costs in setting economically and politically consequential air pol-
lution standards? The Court, per Justice Scalia, easily rejected the
nondelegation challenge to the cost-blind framework of the program
for criteria pollutants.221 After Whitman, it is not credible to object
on nondelegation grounds to a cost-blind framework for a different
set of air pollutants. 
The only difference between the two cases is that in Whitman the
Court held that Congress had clearly created a cost-blind program
218. See 452 U.S. 490, 541 n.75 (1981).
219. Id.
220. See 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001).
221. See id.
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for NAAQS,222 whereas in Michigan, the Court seemed to conclude
that Congress had been ambiguous about its intentions for the air
toxics program.223 But Whitman also teaches that this difference
does not make a difference for nondelegation purposes. There, the
Court reviewed a D.C. Circuit decision holding that EPA’s cost-blind
interpretation of the NAAQS provisions violated the nondelegation
doctrine because EPA had not provided an “intelligible principle” to
guide its discretion; the lower court “hence found that the EPA’s
interpretation (but not the statute itself) violated the nondelegation
doctrine.”224 The Supreme Court quickly dismissed this twist on the
nondelegation doctrine in a single paragraph:
We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a
limiting construction of the statute.... The idea that an agency
can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power
by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us inter-
nally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the pow-
er to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard
that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the
forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates
legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s
voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.225
The Court’s decision in Michigan makes it clear that EPA would
have prevailed if it had adopted a cost-sensitive interpretation of
section 112 of the Clean Air Act.226 But if there had been a true
nondelegation problem in that case, the agency’s “voluntary self-
denial” in adopting a limiting interpretation would have been irrel-
evant to the outcome.227 A nondelegation problem, Whitman teaches,
inheres in the statute itself.228 The Court did not avoid a constitu-
tional problem by construing section 112 the way it did; the statute
did not have a constitutional problem.229
222. See id. at 486.
223. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710 (2015).
224. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
225. Id. at 472-73.
226. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
227. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473.
228. See id. at 472-73.
229. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07, 2711.
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Since the current Court lacks a majority for renovating and re-
vitalizing the nondelegation doctrine, the Court necessarily also
lacks a majority for finding a constitutional problem in situations
that are unproblematic from the perspective of the prevailing non-
delegation doctrine. And since the situations presented in UARG,
King, and Michigan were unproblematic in this way, the Court
would have had no warrant to use the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance to adjust the statutes underlying those cases.
The Court did not, in any event, say that the power canons were
necessary to help avoid a plausible constitutional problem; it did not
describe a constitutional problem at all. Even when it is explicitly
invoked, the avoidance doctrine is a weaselly basis for trimming
statutes Congress has passed. As a silent partner to the Court’s
statutory emendations, it would be even less honest.
Moreover, Professor Manning has offered a compelling argument
against deploying the nondelegation doctrine as a canon of avoid-
ance. Using nondelegation in this way, he has explained, founders
on an internal contradiction:
If the nondelegation doctrine seeks to promote legislative re-
sponsibility for policy choices and to safeguard the process of
bicameralism and presentment, it is odd for the judiciary to
implement it through a technique that asserts the prerogative
to alter a statute’s conventional meaning and, in so doing, to
disturb the apparent lines of compromise produced by the leg-
islative process.230
The judiciary “undermines, rather than furthers,” the interests un-
derlying the nondelegation doctrine by using it, “in effect, to rewrite
the terms of a duly enacted statute.”231 Using the nondelegation
doctrine in this way, moreover, reintroduces the very same kinds of
line-drawing problems that have helped persuade the Court to re-
frain from direct enforcement of the doctrine; as Professor Manning
puts it, “[t]he move from judicial review to avoidance does not
eliminate the difficulties in judicial line-drawing; it simply moves
the line.”232
230. Manning, supra note 208, at 224.
231. Id. at 228.
232. Id. at 258.
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The nondelegation doctrine is not even the constitutional idea
that seems most aligned with the power canons. The nondelegation
doctrine is about the clarity of the instructions Congress gives to the
executive branch.233 Those instructions might be equally unclear—
and thus equally problematic—for deregulation as for regulation.
The power canons, in contrast, disfavor regulation, not deregulation.
When UARG speaks disapprovingly of expansions of regulatory au-
thority, and when Michigan highlights the special meaning of
agency “regulation,” these cases are signaling the Court’s one-way
concern about regulation.234 Agencies can, even with the power
canons in place, expect a Chevron pass when they deregulate.
Indeed, recall that Chevron itself came to life during the Reagan
Administration, and its light touch blessed many of the Administra-
tion’s deregulatory policies.235 It is possible that the power canons
speak not to nondelegation but to a different constitutional norm—
the idea, associated with the Lochner era, that government inter-
vention in private markets comes with a heavy presumption against
it.236 If this is indeed the tradition the Court was calling upon in
creating the power canons, no wonder the Court said nothing about
it. Considered thus, the rulings in the cases discussed here would
be boldly passive rulings indeed: ones that resuscitated a long-dis-
credited constitutional norm while not daring even to name it.
III. THE POWER CANONS’ NORMATIVE PROBLEMS
Professor William Eskridge has offered several normative princi-
ples for evaluating canons of statutory interpretation. In this Part,
I apply Professor Eskridge’s normative tests to the power canons,
and I find the canons fail these tests. I do not claim that the power
canons—or any interpretive canons—are necessarily justified if they
pass the normative tests I apply here. It may be that these are the
kinds of tests that unelected judges are unsuited to administer. My
233. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 535-36.
234. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07; Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2444, 2448-49 (2014).
235. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
236. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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more modest claim is that interpretive canons that fail all of these
tests—as the power canons do—should be shunned.
Professor Eskridge’s evaluative principles draw on rule-of-law
values, democratic values, and “unquestionably cherished” public
values.237 As Professor Eskridge has observed, interpretive rules
that cut across statutes and put a thumb on the scales of particular
interpretive outcomes may upset rule-of-law values such as predict-
ability and objectivity;238 their emergence and application may be
unexpected or uneven, and they may merely reflect judges’ own
political or philosophical preferences. Interpretive rules may also
either facilitate or imperil democratic values by facilitating or
imperiling “Congress’s adoption of statutes that will, in operation,
reflect the aims, goals, and compromises that drove the legislative
process.”239 Finally, interpretive rules may be appealing insofar as
they embrace unquestionably cherished public values such as the
separation of powers and deliberation.240
In many places in this discussion, I fault the power canons for
their departure from Chevron. The principle of deference embraced
in Chevron is itself an interpretive rule, one that also should be
subject to normative analysis.241 If any interpretive principle has
been subjected to normative analysis, however, it is Chevron’s, and
I do not intend to cover that vast territory here. Other scholars have
ably argued that Chevron promotes several of the norms I discuss.242
More fundamentally, as I have argued throughout this Article, the
power canons are not only, or even primarily, about Chevron. The
power canons instruct Congress itself to speak clearly or to have
its voice go unheard. The power canons put the courts in the
position of a passive-aggressive drill sergeant (“I cannot hear you,”
the Court seems to be insisting) rather than an attentive and
237. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 576-82.
238. See id. at 576-77.
239. Id. at 578.
240. See id. at 580.
241. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (identi-
fying that the EPA’s interpretation of the statute at issue was reasonable and entitled to
deference).
242. See generally, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 15.
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respectful listener.243 The power canons are problematic independ-
ent of their rejection of deference under Chevron.
A. Predictability
The power canons defeat predictability in several ways. Most
basically, the power canons’ very novelty undermines any reliance
Congress might have placed on a stable interpretive regime when
enacting statutes prior to the Supreme Court’s embrace of these
canons.244 In particular, the power canons’ retroactive demand for
clarity from Congress departs from the Court’s prior approach to
statutory ambiguity. Some of the Justices who joined the opinions
creating the power canons have, in prior opinions, argued that the
Court should not apply new interpretive principles to statutes en-
acted before the Court embraced those principles.245 They did not
heed that advice in creating the power canons.
Moreover, to the extent the power canons undermine the Chevron
framework, they betray any reliance legislative drafters may have
placed on this framework in developing legislation. Although Pro-
fessors Gluck and Bressman have compellingly shown that it is
often wrong to assume familiarity with and use of canons of stat-
utory interpretation by legislative drafters, Chevron stood out in
their study as an interpretive principle that was both known and
used by many legislative drafters.246 The power canons also upset
the reliance administrative agencies likely placed on the preexisting
interpretive regime.247
243. For a compelling argument that knowledge of congressional procedure—“how Con-
gress does in fact make decisions”—should inform courts’ interpretation of statutes, see gen-
erally Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012).
244. On the general problem of transition posed by the creation of new canons, see Philip
P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1981-86, 1990 (2005).
245. In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, argued in dissent that the Court should not apply a principle of statutory inter-
pretation to statutes passed before the principle was announced. See 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1311
n.1, 1314 & n.3 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 63, at 927 fig.1, 928 fig.2, 941 fig.5, 995-98.
247. On reliance by agencies on the interpretive regime embraced by courts, see Barron &
Kagan, supra note 62, at 227-28; on their reliance on Chevron itself, see Christopher J.
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1005-07, 1020 (2015).
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The interpretive principles embraced in UARG and Michigan are
especially disruptive. UARG is specifically aimed at agencies’ work
in “long-extant” statutory regimes, the very kinds of regimes most
likely to experience disruption when the interpretive ground rules
suddenly change.248 
To the extent there was a coherent jurisprudence on agencies’
discretion to consider costs before Michigan, it cut in the opposite
direction: where the Court had limited agencies’ discretion regard-
ing consideration of costs, it had done so by preventing consider-
ation of costs altogether249 or by precluding a balancing of costs
against benefits.250 A strong theme in previous cases concerning
statutes aimed at protecting human health and the environment
was the recognition that a consideration of costs or a balancing of
costs against benefits could undo the underlying, protective statu-
tory mission.251 To be sure, in two recent environmental cases, the
Supreme Court had upheld, as a reasonable interpretation of the
underlying statutes, EPA’s decision to consider regulatory costs.252
In each case, however, the majority was careful to say that EPA
would have been within its legal rights in taking a different view of
the role of costs in the underlying regulatory decisions.253 In short,
the Supreme Court’s pre-Michigan jurisprudence on the relevance
of cost to regulatory determinations gave little notice of the cost-
sensitive canon to come. Brand-new canons do not promote predict-
ability.
The canons will also prove unpredictable in operation. The power
canons are triggered by circumstances that are highly subjective,
and this subjectivity will undermine predictability going forward.
UARG and King each turn in part on the economic and political
importance of the question at issue. As Professor Sunstein observed
in discussing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. some years
ago, judgments about economic and political importance are sub-
jective and unpredictable.254 Indeed, as he pointed out, Chevron
248. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
249. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468-70 (2001).
250. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509-13, 519-21 (1981).
251. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976).
252. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593, 1610 (2014);
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 224, 226 (2009).
253. See EME Homer City, 134 S. Ct. at 1607; Entergy, 556 U.S. at 218.
254. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 245 (2006).
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itself involved an economically consequential and politically con-
tentious decision about the appropriate deployment of market-based
regulatory measures under the Clean Air Act—yet, obviously, no
interpretive principle based on significance prevented the outcome
there.255 And just last Term, the Supreme Court upheld a highly
consequential rule issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission, incentivizing “demand response” energy programs, without
any hint that the economic and political significance of the matter
affected the Court’s review.256 Canons that appear after a long ab-
sence, then disappear as suddenly, perhaps to return some other
day, undermine legal stability.
UARG and King exacerbate the uncertainty of the “major ques-
tions” idea by adding new, untested factors to the interpretive calcu-
lus. UARG adds the “long-extant” nature of the statutory regime,257
while King adds the perceived inappropriateness of the agency
identified by Congress.258 Changing the interpretive calculus for
longstanding statutory frameworks likely worsens the reliance
problem, especially since Chevron itself focused so intently on the
freedom of administrative agencies to change their policy prefer-
ences under existing statutes.259 And threatening to throw out the
Chevron framework altogether when Congress is perceived to have
chosen the wrong agency for the job may be highly disturbing to a
wide variety of regulatory regimes. In fact, tax lawyers are already
bracing for the possibility that courts may be emboldened to second-
guess the interpretive choices of the Internal Revenue Service in
contexts ranging well beyond the highly salient Affordable Care
Act.260
The cost-sensitive default principle of Michigan v. EPA is also
unpredictable in operation. That case largely turned on the Clean
Air Act’s use of the word “appropriate” in instructing EPA to decide
whether to regulate power plants under section 112 of the Act.261
255. See id. at 232-33.
256. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766-67
(2016).
257. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
258. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2015).
259. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 856-59 (1984).
260. See Ellen P. Aprill, King v. Burwell and Tax Court Review of Regulations, 2015 PEPP.
L. REV. 6, 7, 16-17.
261. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).
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The Court cautioned that not every use of this term in statutes
would trigger the obligation to consider costs, emphasizing that the
Clean Air Act used this language in reference to “regulation.”262
Despite this limit on its holding—which, as I will discuss in the next
Section, only highlights the political valence of the Court’s new
principle—the fact remains that the U.S. Code uses the word
“appropriate” more than 10,000 times.263 Many of these uses relate
to regulatory decisions. Indeed, in just the one provision of the
Clean Air Act at issue in Michigan, section 112, Congress thirty-
three times qualified the exercise of EPA’s discretion with the term
“appropriate.”264 By constructing a principle of statutory interpreta-
tion that by its terms goes beyond the case at hand, the Court has
created unnecessary and unhealthy uncertainty about the meaning
of a pervasive statutory concept. Not only are we now faced with
uncertainty about what the broad term “appropriate” means in
specific statutory contexts, but we also cannot reliably predict which
branch of the government will ultimately decide its meaning.
 What is more, the Michigan canon appears not to turn on specific
statutory language. Justice Scalia offered it as a general principle
of rational agency decision-making, and Justice Kagan opined on
the general relevance of costs to regulatory policy without alluding
to the language of the Clean Air Act.265 It appears, therefore, that all
nine Justices have signed on to the proposition that agencies must,
unless Congress provides otherwise, consider costs either when
deciding to regulate or in developing regulations. The potential
reach of the canon decreases legal stability, both for Congress and
for agencies. The canon does not depend on magic words (like “ap-
propriate”) that can be either avoided or deployed by Congress, or
treated with special care by agencies; it depends on an overarching
view of rationality that will, almost inevitably, be unpredictable in
application.
262. Id. at 2707.
263. See supra note 25.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
265. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707; id. at 2716-17 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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B. Objectivity
As Professor Eskridge has observed, substantive canons derived
from “context-driven substantive judgments by ideologically in-
spired judges ... can undermine the rule of law.”266 The power canons
fit this description. The basic problem with these canons is that they
appear to assume that a passive agency is better than an active one.
But this is so only if passive government is one’s preference. This is
not an objective preference.
The interpretive principles embraced in King v. Burwell and
UARG v. EPA are highly subjective. Their common feature is the
presence of an issue of great “economic and political significance.”267
This is not an objective test of statutory meaning. The very identifi-
cation of issues as economically and politically significant in the
relevant way involves subjective judgments. 
This point is well made by comparing UARG to Chevron itself. In
both UARG and Chevron, the Court considered the circumstances
that would trigger the requirements for stationary-source permit-
ting under the Clean Air Act.268 In UARG, the permitting program
at issue was the Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
program.269 In Chevron, it was the Act’s New Source Review (NSR)
program.270 These are two sides of the same coin; the difference is
the relative cleanliness of the air in the area where a permitted
source is located. But in UARG, the Court thought ambiguity in the
statute did not justify the agency’s triggering of the permitting re-
quirement,271 whereas in Chevron the Court thought ambiguity in
the statute did justify the agency’s declination to trigger the per-
mitting requirement.272 
What is the difference in the two situations? In UARG, sources
were regulated on account of the agency’s interpretive choice; in
Chevron, they were deregulated on account of the agency’s inter-
266. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 577.
267. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134
S. Ct. 2427, 2442-44 (2014).
268. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2435; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984).
269. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2435.
270. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 846-47, 855-57.
271. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2435.
272. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 846-47, 855-57.
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pretive choice. If there were still any doubt about the political thrust
of the UARG canon, it would be laid to rest by the Court’s emphasis
on EPA’s “expansion” of regulatory authority.273 To make interpre-
tive deference turn on the regulatory or deregulatory, or contractive
or expansive, thrust of an agency’s choice is not a neutral choice.
The subjectivity of the canons that turn on “economic and political
significance” is deepened by the fact that the same economically and
politically significant issue lies on both sides of the interpretive
question, yet the Court has privileged certain kinds of agency
decisions over others. In UARG, if EPA had interpreted the Clean
Air Act not to trigger permitting requirements for stationary sources
of greenhouse gases once mobile sources were regulated, this would
have been answering the very same question that the Court thought
was of such great economic and political significance.274 It just would
have been giving a different answer to the question. An agency does
not stay away from issues of great significance by answering them
in one way rather than another; either answer engages with the
same issues that the Court has deemed so significant Congress could
not have meant to give them to an agency through subtle or indirect
signals. The fact that the Court in UARG did not see it that way
shows that the Court’s real worry was not that the agency would
make a really big interpretive decision without clear statutory lan-
guage telling it to, but that it would make the wrong interpretive
decision.
The factor of economic and political significance also privileges
agency inaction over action. The Court’s cases make clear that only
some kinds of very important decisions fit within the canon. In
considering “economic” significance, the Court seems to weigh only
the burdens on industry of agency action, not the burdens on reg-
ulatory beneficiaries of agency passivity. The Court did not much
care about the problem of climate change and the costs of stepped-
down agency action in UARG,275 nor did it appear to take into
account the gargantuan economic and human-health costs of pas-
sivity on smoking in undoing the FDA’s rule in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.276 Not acting on the dangers of smoking
273. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
274. Cf. id.
275. See id.
276. See 529 U.S. 120, 159-61 (2000).
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in light of the FDA’s newly discovered evidence that the tobacco
industry deliberately manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes to
produce a desired physiological response also would have answered
a question of enormous significance, but the very premise of the
Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson is that inaction was the
proper course. 
“Political” significance also has a skewed application. In Brown
& Williamson, for example, the Court explicitly noted the political
power of the tobacco industry in highlighting the political signifi-
cance of the regulation of tobacco and tobacco products.277 If “poli-
tical significance” is tied to political influence, an interpretive canon
that turns on such significance will surely favor regulated industries
over regulatory beneficiaries. 
The cost-sensitive canon of Michigan v. EPA is similarly ideologi-
cal. This canon, too, is triggered only by regulation, not by agency
inaction or deregulation.278 Justice Scalia makes this point explicit-
ly in explaining that the use of the term “appropriate” in the context
of section 112 of the Clean Air Act must mean that the agency may
not omit consideration of costs because “appropriate” is used in
reference to “regulation.”279 Justice Kagan also expressly links her
cost-sensitive canon to regulation: “(absent contrary indication from
Congress) an agency must take costs into account in some manner
before imposing significant regulatory burdens.”280 Regulatory bur-
dens alone—not the burdens associated with the absence or with-
drawal of regulatory protections—trigger the obligation to consider
costs. The preference for the absence or withdrawal of regulation
over the use of regulation is not neutral or objective.
This preference appears to match the ideological preferences of
the majority and dissenting Justices. Justice Scalia had long copped
to his antiregulatory leanings, particularly in the environmental
domain.281 He had for years maintained that a failure to follow
277. See id. at 147.
278. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
279. Id. (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
281. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Paper, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Envi-
ronmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97, 105-06 (1987) (“An agency that exercises its discretion
in the direction of more limited application of the environmental laws is not necessarily false
to its responsibilities; and an agency that exercises it in the direction of more expansive ap-
plication is not necessarily true to them.”).
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through on the environmental promise of the environmental laws
may be a good thing, not a bad thing.282 What may be less obvious
is how Justice Kagan’s cost-sensitive interpretive principle also ap-
pears to match her own ideological preferences. Her signature piece
of scholarship as a law professor extolled the virtues of “presidential
administration,” or the active intervention by the President in
agencies’ regulatory decisions.283 A centerpiece of presidential ad-
ministration in the current era is White House review of agencies’
major rules, and a centerpiece of this review is cost-benefit an-
alysis.284 Justice Kagan’s dissent in Michigan v. EPA, in fact, draws
on the practice of White House regulatory review and its accompa-
nying cost-benefit analysis as support for her view that EPA ad-
equately considered costs in deciding to regulate power plants under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act.285 Her interpretive default principle
matches her ideological preference for the kind of regulatory eval-
uation that takes place within the White House.
The power canons are also subjective insofar as they rely on
factors that may be turned on or off, depending on the level of
generality at which they are described. Consider the Court’s insis-
tence in King that Congress choose the right agency for the inter-
pretive job.286 Although the Court does not acknowledge it, in fact,
the Court needed to do important interpretive work even in deciding
that the IRS was not the right agency for this job. In choosing to
focus on agency expertise, the Court needed to choose a substantive
frame for the Affordable Care Act: Was it a health-care statute, ill-
suited to the IRS’s skill set, or was it a tax revenue statute, well
within the IRS’s wheelhouse? The best answer was probably that it
was both—an exceedingly complex regulatory regime that contained
many different elements, calling on a variety of forms of agency ex-
pertise. But the Court’s search for the correct interpretive agent
pressed it to identify just one characterization of the Affordable
282. See, e.g., id.
283. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2383-84 (2001).
284. See Lisa Heinzerling, Lecture, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Rela-
tionship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325,
350 (2014).
285. See 135 S. Ct. at 2715, 2721-22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
286. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489, 2496 (2015).
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Care Act. This was not a neutral—or even sensible—anterior inter-
pretive decision.
The factor of economic and political significance also surges or
recedes depending on the way one frames the underlying legal
question. In UARG, the Court could have looked at EPA’s overall
framework for bringing greenhouse gas emissions into the permit-
ting program for stationary sources. If the Court had done this, it
would have found that EPA’s program actually only moderately
increased the number of sources in the program.287 Seen this way,
the question whether any sources should be brought into the
program based solely on their greenhouse gas emissions was not
actually a question of great economic and political significance.
Instead, however, the Court chose to look at just one aspect of the
regulatory framework—the triggering rule—and declare it of “vast
economic and political significance.”288 When so much turns on the
initial framing of the issue, results going forward are bound to
reflect subjective preferences.
C. Democratic Values
Professor Eskridge argues that normative canons may be justified
by “democracy values” insofar as they “help unelected judges, stran-
gers to the statutory project, to understand the policy assumptions,
trade-offs, purposes, and deals that characterize the serious process
of statute-making in our system.”289 The power canons do the
opposite: they substitute a one-size-fits-all presumption for mean-
ingful engagement with the details of the underlying statutory
scheme.
In UARG, the Court’s interpretive principle disfavoring fresh
exercises of authority under longstanding statutes brushed past the
possibility that the breadth of the Clean Air Act’s language—partic-
ularly its definition of “air pollutant”—signaled a congressional
desire for the agency to reach new environmental problems without
287. Cf. Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,454
(Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537,
and 538) (describing the vehicles to be affected by regulation).
288. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
289. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 579.
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further recourse to the legislative process.290 A basic purpose of
broad statutory language is to allow precisely the outcome the Court
disapproved in UARG: the fresh assertion of regulatory authority as
information develops showing that regulatory intervention is war-
ranted. To introduce a presumption against this kind of regulatory
evolution is to disrespect the choices implicit in broad statutory
terms.291
King has a different problem when it comes to democratic values.
Ultimately, this decision respected the legislative process insofar
as it declined to upend Congress’ work product through fixation on
four words in a complicated statute and instead looked at the whole
of the statutory framework. However, before engaging in a sensible
analysis of the legislative process that led to the Affordable Care
Act, the Court embraced an interpretive principle that is not, itself,
sensitive to detail and context. Elements of the interpretive prin-
ciple embraced in King—economic and political importance and the
perceived appropriateness of the agency Congress chose for the
interpretive job292—are insensitive to the fine-grained details of the
legislative process. In fact, with the exception of a brief discussion
of the political influence of the tobacco industry in Brown &
Williamson, the Court has never explained the factual assumptions
underlying its determinations of “economic and political signifi-
cance” or identified exactly how much economic and political sig-
nificance is enough.293 The interpretive principle embraced in King
did not, as it happens, upend the legislative work product at issue
in that case, but it did plant a land mine for future cases.
Understanding how the cost-sensitive canon embraced in Michi-
gan v. EPA disrespects the “policy assumptions, trade-offs, pur-
poses, and deals”294 embedded in section 112 of the Clean Air Act
requires a deeper dive into section 112 and the legal context
surrounding EPA’s rule.
The regulation at issue in Michigan was decades in the making.295
This regulation—known as “MATS,” for “Mercury and Air Toxics
290. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2431-32.
291. See id.
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000).
294. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 579.
295. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2718 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Standards”—limited toxic air pollution from power plants.296 The
provision of the Clean Air Act under which the rule was promul-
gated, section 112, had called for control of hazardous air pollutants
from stationary sources since 1970.297 After EPA had managed to
regulate only seven hazardous air pollutants in twenty years under
section 112’s original framework, Congress in 1990 overhauled sec-
tion 112 in the hope of creating a regulatory program for hazardous
air pollutants that would actually regulate some hazardous air
pollutants.298
Congress listed the initial pollutants to be regulated—187 in all—
and set strict and precise technology-based requirements for sources
emitting these pollutants.299 However, cognizant of its simultaneous
creation of additional new regulatory requirements for power plants,
in particular an emissions trading program to address acid rain,300
Congress tasked EPA with first studying the hazardous air pollution
that would remain once the other new requirements were in place
and then deciding whether regulation under section 112 was
“appropriate and necessary” in light of the agency’s research.301
After Congress revamped section 112 of the Clean Air Act in 1990,
a decade passed before EPA determined, at the very end of the
Clinton Administration, that regulation under section 112 was “ap-
propriate and necessary,” despite the other requirements imposed
by Congress in 1990.302 The Clinton Administration then gave way
to the Administration of George W. Bush, and almost another
decade passed while the latter Administration tried to substitute
regulation under section 111 of the Clean Air Act for regulation
under section 112, so that it could avoid the rigorous technology-
based requirements of section 112 and in their place create a
trading program for hazardous air pollutants from power plants.303
296. Flexible Implementation of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards Rule, 76 Fed. Reg.
80,727, 80,727 (Dec. 27, 2011).
297. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, pt. 1, at 151 (1990).
298. See id. at 151, 154 (discussing the amendment’s creation of a statutory list of over 170
air pollutants).
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2012) (listing pollutants); id. § 7412(d) (describing technology-
based requirements).
300. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, pt. 1, at 468.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
302. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utili-
ty Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825-26 (Dec. 20, 2000).
303. See Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
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The D.C. Circuit rejected this legal experiment because EPA had not
followed section 112’s requirements for deregulating sources of
hazardous air pollutants.304 At last, in 2012, EPA issued a final rule
governing hazardous air pollutants from power plants.305 This is the
rule the Supreme Court rejected, as premised on an inadequate
threshold finding of appropriateness, in Michigan v. EPA.306
A key to understanding the MATS rule is the legal environment
in which it developed. During the rule’s long gestation, the D.C.
Circuit repeatedly affirmed the broad applicability and unyielding
strictness of the technology-based requirements of section 112 in
rejecting EPA’s efforts to avoid them.307 EPA lost case after case in
the D.C. Circuit, with most of the decisions faulting EPA for
regulating too little rather than for regulating too much.308 When
EPA tried—more than once—to regulate only some of the hazardous
air pollutants emitted by sources covered under section 112, the
D.C. Circuit rebuffed the agency, directing it to regulate all of the
hazardous air pollutants from those sources.309 When EPA tried to
avoid the pollution controls required by section 112 by explain-
ing—in the words of section 112—that such controls were not
“appropriate” or “viable,” the court again scolded the agency for
failing to impose controls on all covered sources.310 When EPA tried
to soften the technology-based standards of section 112 by requiring
sources to install only those controls all sources could achieve,
rather than the controls the best performers achieved in practice,
the agency lost again.311 When EPA tried to create a “low-risk”
Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, and 75) (describing EPA’s decision to regulate air pollutants under
section 111 of the Clean Air Act).
304. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
305. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304,
9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63).
306. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07, 2712 (2015).
307. See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (finding the maximum emissions reduction achievable cannot be less than what the
best-performing sources achieve).
308. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding EPA
must regulate all hazardous air pollutants under section 112).
309. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1371-73 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Nat’l Lime
Ass’n, 233 F.3d at 633-34.
310. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
311. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal., 255 F.3d at 861.
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subcategory of sources eligible for exemption from all emission
reduction requirements (under a provision directing the agency to
subcategorize sources “as appropriate”), the court found that the
attempt violated the plain language of section 112.312 When the
agency created an affirmative defense to citizen suits, giving a pass
to sources exceeding emissions limits due to “unavoidable” malfunc-
tions, the court again held that the agency had gone too far in
letting sources off the hook, rejecting the agency’s plea for the court
to “presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of
such power.”313 And when EPA tried to avoid regulation of power
plants under section 112 by citing the superior efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of its preferred regulatory approach under section 111
of the Clean Air Act,314 the D.C. Circuit, in New Jersey v. EPA,
instructed EPA that the only way to deregulate power plants under
section 112 was to make the strict, risk-based findings specified in
section 112(c)(9).315 The court chided the agency for using “the logic
312. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1372-73.
313. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055, 1062-64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
314. Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 15,994, 16,005 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
63) [hereinafter Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding].
315. See 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Section 112(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(c)(9) (2012), specifies the following risk-based determinations as prerequisites to
delisting sources under section 112:
(B) The Administrator may delete any source category from the list under this
subsection, on petition of any person or on the Administrator’s own motion,
whenever the Administrator makes the following determination or determina-
tions, as applicable:
(i) In the case of hazardous air pollutants emitted by sources in the category
that may result in cancer in humans, a determination that no source in the
category (or group of sources in the case of area sources) emits such hazardous
air pollutants in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater
than one in one million to the individual in the population who is most exposed
to emissions of such pollutants from the source (or group of sources in the case
of area sources).
(ii) In the case of hazardous air pollutants that may result in adverse health
effects in humans other than cancer or adverse environmental effects, a deter-
mination that emissions from no source in the category or subcategory concerned
(or group of sources in the case of area sources) exceed a level which is adequate
to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no adverse
environmental effect will result from emissions from any source (or from a group
of sources in the case of area sources).
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of the Queen of Hearts, substituting EPA’s desires for the plain text
of section 112(c)(9).”316
EPA and industry thus found themselves in a legal bind after the
2008 decision in New Jersey v. EPA. According to the explicit terms
of section 112, no one could challenge EPA’s 2000 finding that
regulation of power plants under section 112 was “appropriate and
necessary” until EPA actually finalized emission standards for
power plants.317 Yet with the 2000 determination in place, EPA
remained under a legal obligation to regulate power plants under
section 112.318 EPA could avoid that obligation by making the risk-
based findings specified in section 112(c)(9), but the agency had not
made such findings and had never claimed it could do so.319
Awkwardly, then, the only realistic way for the agency to avoid its
obligation to regulate power plants under section 112 was to ac-
tually regulate power plants under section 112—and then wait for
a court to confirm what the agency at that time believed, which was
that the predicate determination of appropriateness and necessity
was mistaken.
Urging the full D.C. Circuit to correct this “absurd” result, EPA
and industry petitioned for rehearing en banc of the panel decision
in New Jersey v. EPA. The agency argued, in essence, that it was ri-
diculous to require the agency to go through a laborious rulemaking
process only to obtain a judgment as to the legality of the predicate
determination underlying the whole rulemaking. The D.C. Circuit
was not convinced; the court denied the petition for rehearing en
banc.320 
EPA, states, and industry groups then filed petitions for certio-
rari, making the same basic legal pitch they had made to the D.C.
Circuit. EPA argued:
316. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582.
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4); see also Util. Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001
WL 936363 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001) (per curiam) (finding that EPA’s 2000 determination that
regulation of power plants was “appropriate and necessary” under section 112 was not final
agency action subject to judicial review).
318. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9).
319. Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding, supra note 314, at 16,032-33.
320. New Jersey v. EPA, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2008). Five of the active judges on
the circuit—out of a total of ten active judges—did not participate in the decision whether to
grant rehearing. See id. (noting that Judges Ginsburg, Henderson, Randolph, Garland, and
Kavanaugh did not participate).
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If left unreviewed, the court’s ruling will ... require EPA to
devote considerable resources to the formulation of emission
standards that will be rendered superfluous if the initial 2000
listing decision—a decision that the agency itself has since
concluded was flawed at the time it was issued—is ultimately
overturned on judicial review.321
The agency asserted that the lower court’s interpretation “frustrates
Congress’s purpose in establishing distinct criteria for regulation of
power plants under Section 7412”322 and that “Section 7412(n)(1)(A)
is properly understood to vest EPA with continuing, temporally
unbounded discretion to determine, based either on new data or on
re-examination of previously considered evidence, whether regula-
tion of power plants under Section 7412 is ‘appropriate and neces-
sary.’”323 Along similar lines, the Utility Air Regulatory Group
argued in its petition that the decision below required it “to partic-
ipate in many more years of unnecessary rulemaking activities
simply because the court has refused to address EPA’s authority to
list [power plants] in the first place.”324
Then the administration changed hands again. The Obama Ad-
ministration disagreed with the Bush Administration’s view that
the predicate finding for regulating power plants under section 112
was inadequate. Indeed, the new Administration soon resolved to
comply with New Jersey v. EPA by developing emission standards
for power plants under section 112. For the government, this de-
cision mooted the petition for certiorari it had recently filed, as the
government now intended to meet rather than avoid the regulatory
obligation created by its 2000 determination on power plants. The
Solicitor General’s office was persuaded to withdraw its petition for
certiorari with the explanation that the government intended to
move forward with emission standards under section 112.325 States
and industry groups, for their part, had no such change of heart and
321. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, EPA v. New Jersey, 555 U.S. 1162 (2009) (No. 08-
512). 
322. Id. at 16.
323. Id. at 17.
324. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. New Jersey, 555 U.S.
1169 (2009) (No. 08-352).
325. See Motion of the Environmental Protection Agency to Dismiss the Case, EPA v. New
Jersey, 555 U.S. 1162 (2009) (No. 08-512).
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continued to press for Supreme Court review using the same kinds
of arguments that the government had initially asserted. The Court
denied certiorari.326
Thus the matter rested once more in EPA’s hands. After more
than a decade of losing cases in which it had attempted to moderate
the strict technology-based standards of section 112, EPA faced a
straitjacketed legal environment in crafting a response to the court’s
rejection of its attempt to take power plants outside the confines of
section 112. The D.C. Circuit’s invalidation of the agency’s efforts to
ease section 112’s requirements meant that sources already reg-
ulated under section 112—oil refineries, cement kilns, brick kilns,
wood products, and more327—would be obligated to follow the tech-
nology-based requirements of section 112 to the letter. All of these
sources, combined, emitted a lower volume of many hazardous air
pollutants than the single category of power plants.328 If EPA did not
subject power plants to the same legal burdens, it would, incongru-
ously, be regulating the more highly polluting sources less strictly
than the less polluting sources. Moreover, in the interval between
the listing of power plants under section 112 and the promulgation
of emission standards for these sources, EPA and the states were
under an obligation to apply the technology-based requirements of
section 112 to new, modified, and reconstructed sources on a case-
by-case basis—meaning that even without a final rule on power
plants in place, such sources (if newly built or modified) would be
required to comply with section 112’s technology-based require-
ments.329 In addition, EPA’s losing streak in the D.C. Circuit fea-
tured a long list of cases in which the court reminded the agency
that section 112 had been amended in 1990 precisely in order to
tighten regulation of hazardous air pollutants and to ensure that
the agency could not once again evade its regulatory obligations.330
326. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 555 U.S. at 1169.
327. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/list-national-emission-standards-
hazardous-air-pollutants-neshap [https://perma.cc/JB8E-Z7B3] (last updated Nov. 15, 2016).
328. Brief of Respondents American Academy of Pediatrics at 10, Michigan v. EPA, 135
S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46) (citing EPA’s figures showing that power plants emitted 50
percent of mercury air emissions, 62 percent of arsenic, 82 percent of hydrochloric acid, 62
percent of hydrogen fluoride, and 83 percent of selenium).
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2) (2012).
330. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rogers, J.);
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The court’s message—delivered by judges spanning the political
spectrum—was that EPA had overreached by under-regulating.
When it came time to issue the final rule on power plants, EPA
heeded the D.C. Circuit’s admonitions to favor pollution control
over economic efficiency, to avoid inventing escape hatches through
which sources could wriggle out of section 112’s technology-based
requirements, and to regulate all hazardous air pollutants from cov-
ered sources. Following the lower court’s legal instructions meant
creating a giant rule.
The Supreme Court acknowledged no part of this legal context in
Michigan v. EPA. Rather than understanding, and working with,
the unwaveringly strict scheme created by section 112 and ela-
borated on in numerous cases in the D.C. Circuit, the Court ma-
jority created an interpretive principle that cast doubt on the very
rationality of such a scheme.331 And Justice Kagan, in dissent, may
have damned the section 112 regulatory framework by indirection
when she overstated the sensitivity of that framework to fundamen-
tal concerns about costs.332 The blunt tool of the cost-sensitive canon
allowed the Court to ignore statutory history and design, and its use
in Michigan drove an undemocratic wedge between the legislative
framework and the judicial outcome.
D. Public Values
For Professor Eskridge, a last category of substantive values that
might justify some normative canons are “[s]ubstantive values that
are unquestionably cherished in our history.”333 He predicts that
“the public values that courts can most effectively support are insti-
tutional or process values, such as separation of powers, federalism,
and deliberation.”334 He concedes that “judicial enforcement of public
Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1235-36 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Sentelle, J.);
Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(Randolph, Roger & Tatel, JJ.); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(Ginsburg & Tatel, JJ.); Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 660, 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Williams, J.); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 37-41 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Buckley, J.).
331. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-10 (2015).
332. See id. at 2714-15, 2718-22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
333. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 580.
334. Id.
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values typically comes at the expense of democracy and often the
rule of law as well,” thus raising the “devilish question of competing
values.”335
As applied to the power canons, however, Professor Eskridge’s
values do not compete with each other; they all move in the same
direction, against the normative validation of these canons. We have
already seen how the power canons undermine democratic values
and rule-of-law values like predictability and objectivity.336 They
also undermine the public values of separation of powers and de-
liberation.337
The power canons aggrandize the courts at the expense of Con-
gress and the executive. They change the ground rules of statutory
interpretation after the other branches have acted, upsetting the
reliance the other branches may have placed in the preexisting
interpretive regime and yet not replacing that regime with stable
and predictable rules that could foster reliance moving forward. The
very selectivity of the new interpretive principles must put Congress
and the agencies in a state of anxiety about how they can avoid the
narrowing tendencies of these principles. For its part, Congress
must try to predict which statutory questions the courts will later
deem economically and politically significant—even as it writes
broad language that may not foresee every issue that may arise or
may be taken as ambiguity rather than breadth by a court eager to
trim an ambitious statutory regime. For their part, agencies face the
prospect of having their work least respected even while it is most
important—economically, politically, and statutorily. In these ways,
the courts—through the power canons—put the other branches in
a position of submission rather than strength. From a separation-of-
powers perspective, in a context where, as I have discussed, there
is no underlying constitutional problem,338 this situation is exactly
backwards.
335. Id.
336. See supra Parts III.A-B.
337. I focus on these two values, and omit federalism, as the content of the power canons
does not directly implicate federalism—unlike, for example, the principle that Congress must
speak in “unmistakably clear” terms if it “intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government.’” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
338. See supra Part II.B.
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Deliberation also suffers under the three cases discussed here.
The Court’s circuitous route to the correct result in King initially
prized beady-eyed textualism over close attention to the overall
structure and purposes of a massive piece of legislation. This inter-
pretive method renders congressional deliberation quite beside the
point; hearings, statements, findings, and all of the other parts of
congressional deliberation are sidelined to treat a panic attack
induced by four errant words in a massive law. Although the Court
eventually recovered enough to reach the correct result despite its
circuitous methodology, its opinion gives comfort to those who would
ignore the deliberations of Congress and focus only on its words. In
UARG and Michigan, an agency’s years-long, public processes of
outreach and reason-giving—and close attention to the whole set of
legal constraints under which it believed it was operating—meant
little compared to the Court’s rage over regulatory ambition.339 In all
of these cases, it was the agencies, not the Court, which operated
openly and publicly, subject to continuous oversight by Congress
and the White House and to the basic administrative law command
to explain themselves with reasons and evidence. Interpretive prin-
ciples like the power canons, with their simplifying assumptions
and barely concealed antipathy to regulatory ambition, are perfect
instruments for cutting off debate. They are not instruments for
promoting it.
It may be hardest to see this point with respect to the canon
embraced in Michigan v. EPA. This canon came wrapped in deliber-
ative rationality, offered as the only sane approach to deciding
whether to undertake a major regulatory program. As Justice Scalia
observed, after all, “costs” are simply “disadvantages,” and “reason-
able regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advan-
tages and the disadvantages of agency decisions.”340 What could be
wrong with the Court imposing a requirement that agencies con-
sider advantages and disadvantages in developing regulation?
In fact, however, it is not clear that the Court means to require—
or even allow—attention to all the advantages and disadvantages
of regulation. The Court declined to say, for example, whether the
339. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-10 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
340. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
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“ancillary” benefits of regulating power plants under section 112—in
particular, the benefits associated with controlling air pollutants not
covered by section 112—could be considered by EPA on remand.341
If Michigan truly were—as the Court styles it—an affirmation of a
duty to consider both the advantages and disadvantages of govern-
ment action,342 it should have necessarily followed that there are no
artificial constraints on the kinds of advantages an agency may and
indeed must consider. Yet not only did the Court decline to confirm
the relevance of “ancillary” benefits, it insisted on reporting the
benefits of the MATS rule as if the ancillary benefits did not exist.343
Beyond ignoring certain environmental benefits in Michigan
itself, the Court has long condoned agencies’ failures to consider
these benefits across a wide variety of cases. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has been a primary force in weakening statutory require-
ments, found in the National Environmental Policy Act, to consider
the environmental consequences of agency decisions.344 In other
words, even in a context in which agencies operate under a special
statutory requirement to consider environmental consequences in
their decisions, the Supreme Court has done all it can to soften that
requirement. It would be bold to suggest that the Court in Michigan
took all of that back and put in place a requirement that agencies
making decisions that affect the environment must consider all
kinds of consequences beyond economic ones. Unless that is what
the Court meant to do, however, its decision does not promote the
form of rationality that counsels consideration of the balance of
reasons.
Congress itself operates as much by instructing agencies what not
to consider as it does by telling them what they must consider. A
huge question in administrative law, in fact, has been to figure out
what factors agencies may consider in coming to regulatory deci-
sions.345 Often, the Supreme Court has declined to require agencies
341. Id. at 2711.
342. See id. at 2707.
343. Id. at 2706 (reporting benefits of $4 to $6 million per year).
344. See JONATHAN Z. CANNON, ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND
THE SUPREME COURT 239-65 (2015). The Court has, famously, never ruled in favor of an
environmental plaintiff in a case under the National Environmental Policy Act—the federal
statute that aims to ensure consideration of environmental consequences in federal agency
decision-making. See id. at 232-33.
345. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making
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to consider issues that are logically relevant to the matter the
agency is deciding.346 Sometimes, the Court has forbidden agencies
to consider logically relevant issues.347 A court-imposed requirement
that agencies consider all of the logically relevant advantages and
disadvantages of regulatory decisions would not only depart from
this tradition, but it would also increase the discretion of adminis-
trative agencies to go their own way. Enlarging the range of factors
considered in administrative decision-making gives agencies more,
not less, power to come out either way on any given decision. If the
Court is indeed worried about the discretion of administrative
agencies, it should disfavor rather than favor an all-things-consid-
ered analysis by the agencies. If, however, the Court is actually
worried not about discretion that could cut in either regulatory
direction, but only about the power of agencies to constrain eco-
nomic behavior, then a rule that agencies consider regulatory costs
makes sense—if one is able to accept the naked political premises
of such a rule.
To rule out some considerations, even important ones, in making
regulatory decisions is perfectly consistent with rationality. In eve-
ryday life, we often make decisions not based, all things considered,
on the balance of reasons, but instead based, as Professor Raz has
put it, on a reason “to refrain from acting for some reason.”348
Professor Raz defends the idea of “exclusionary reasons” by positing
individuals who refrain from acting on the balance of reasons—the
person who refrains from making a financial investment at the end
of a hard day, not because the balance of reasons is against the
investment, but because she has a good “reason not to act on the
merits of the case”;349 the soldier who obeys an order not because the
balance of reasons supports it but because “[t]he order is a reason
for doing what you were ordered regardless of the balance of
a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67. 
346. See id. at 69-73 (discussing Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United Distrib.
Cos., 498 U.S. 211 (1991); and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990)).
347. See id. at 71-72, 78-81 (discussing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); and Whitman v. Am. Truck-
ing Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)).
348. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 39 (Oxford University Press 1999) (1975)
(discussing “exclusionary reasons”).
349. Id. at 37.
2017] THE POWER CANONS 2003
reasons”;350 the father who does not consider the effects on his own
career choices of sending his child to private school because he has
promised his wife to make decisions about his child’s education
based only on the child’s interests.351 Recognizing our own occasional
inability to make judgments based on the balance of reasons and
making decisions based on our role in institutional or social contexts
is not to act irrationally even if the actions taken on the basis of a
restricted set of reasons are not the actions that would be taken if
the balance of reasons were guiding the action.
Exclusionary reasons likewise may support an agency that “re-
frains from acting based on some reason,”352 even if its enabling
statute does not require that it so refrain. As noted, an agency
acting with constraints on the considerations it brings to bear on
regulatory decisions actually enjoys less, not more, discretion. An
agency that perceives its institutional role as subordinate and the
broadest discretion as inconsistent with this role might well choose
to limit the considerations it may bring to bear on its decisions. Far
from showing an out-of-control agency, the concept of exclusionary
reasons demonstrates how an agency that has not acted based on
the balance of reasons is a more tightly rather than less tightly
constrained agency. Certainly, an agency is not acting irrationally
when it declines to act based on the balance of reasons.
CONCLUSION
The power canons are the most dangerous kind of canon from
a democratic perspective—normative instructions from unelected
judges to the legislative and executive branches, unhitched to any
plausible constitutional post. The three decisions discussed here are
still young, and so it remains to be seen what the Supreme Court
and lower courts will make of the power canons. Perhaps the canons
will be deployed only occasionally, or abandoned altogether for a
time, to be resuscitated at a later date. This would not make them
harmless. While they exist, they make Congress uncertain of the
words it must use to set in motion an active regulatory program and
350. Id. at 38.
351. See id. at 39. 
352. Id.
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to make agencies rather than courts the interpreters of first resort,
and they make agencies uncertain of their interpretive authority.
This uncertainty may be a great comfort to those hoping that legal
anxiety will encourage regulatory timidity, but it should not please
anyone else.
